This paper investigates the value added by private information exchanges that share information on business payment performance. We discuss how this information is collected and disseminated by the worldÕs largest private information broker, Dun & Bradstreet. We provide the first empirical examination of the importance of this information at the lending decision level. Our findings indicate that exchange-generated information provides significant explanatory power in failure prediction models controlling for other credit information that is easily available to lenders. Our study complements the work of Jappelli and Pagano [Information sharing, lending and defaults; Cross country evidence, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper 2184, 1999] who find in cross-country macro level tests that information exchanges add value.

This article tests the ability of traditional capital structure theories to explain the issuance decisions of real estate investment trusts (REITs). For issuances made between 1997 and 2006, we find strong support for the market timing theory of capital structure. Controlling for past returns and growth, a REIT is more likely to issue equity when its price-to-net asset value ratio is high. This suggests that REITs issue equity in public markets when the cost of equity capital is lower in the public market than in the private market. Consistent with traditional market timing, REITs are more likely to issue equity after experiencing large price increases. We also find some support for REITs following the trade-off theory of capital structure. REITs are less likely to issue debt when proxies for expected bankruptcy costs are high. Copyright (c) 2009 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

This paper empirically analyzes REIT mutual funds. We show that, contrary to most mutual fund studies, the average and median alphas (net of expenses) are positive. We also find that time-varying positive alphas are much more likely to occur when the real asset market is performing poorly, suggesting that managers add more value in down markets than in up markets. We examine the cross-sectional determinants of both standard alphas and the average of time-varying alphas and find that both increase with assets and turnover. Cross-sectionally, we find that actively managed funds have higher alphas than passively managed funds.

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This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering (IPO) date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage and have better long-term performance. Our sample is a set of 107 IPOs of real estate investment trusts (REITs) between 1991 and 1998. Using a single industry and REITs in particular reduces potentially confounding effects due to differences in risk, transparency, and growth potential. We believe this-combined with our use of IPOs-mitigates the endogeneity problem present in studies of the impact of governance on seasoned firms' valuation. Our analysis indicates that firms with stronger governance structures have higher IPO valuations and better long-term operating performance than their peers. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..