We propose a model-free deep reinforcement learning method that leverages a small amount of demonstration data to assist a reinforcement learning agent. We apply this approach to robotic manipulation tasks and train end-to-end visuomotor policies that map directly from RGB camera inputs to joint velocities. We demonstrate that our approach can solve a wide variety of visuomotor tasks, for which engineering a scripted controller would be laborious. In experiments, our reinforcement and imitation agent achieves significantly better performances than agents trained with reinforcement learning or imitation learning alone. We also illustrate that these policies, trained with large visual and dynamics variations, can achieve preliminary successes in zero-shot sim2real transfer. A brief visual description of this work can be viewed in this video.

We propose zoneout, a novel method for regularizing RNNs. At each timestep, zoneout stochastically forces some hidden units to maintain their previous values. Like dropout, zoneout uses random noise to train a pseudo-ensemble, improving generalization. But by preserving instead of dropping hidden units, gradient information and state information are more readily propagated through time, as in feedforward stochastic depth networks. We perform an empirical investigation of various RNN regularizers, and find that zoneout gives significant performance improvements across tasks. We achieve competitive results with relatively simple models in character-and word-level language modelling on the Penn Treebank and Text8 datasets, and combining with recurrent batch normalization (Cooijmans et al., 2016) yields state-of-the-art results on permuted sequential MNIST.

No abstract

There is considerable uncertainty about what properties, capabilities and motivations future AGIs will have. In some plausible scenarios, AGIs may pose security risks arising from accidents and defects. In order to mitigate these risks, prudent early AGI research teams will perform significant testing on their creations before use. Unfortunately, if an AGI has human-level or greater intelligence, testing itself may not be safe; some natural AGI goal systems create emergent incentives for AGIs to tamper with their test environments, make copies of themselves on the internet, or convince developers and operators to do dangerous things. In this paper, we survey the AGI containment problem -the question of how to build a container in which tests can be conducted safely and reliably, even on AGIs with unknown motivations and capabilities that could be dangerous. We identify requirements for AGI containers, available mechanisms, and weaknesses that need to be addressed.

With almost daily improvements in capabilities of artificial intelligence it is more important than ever to develop safety software for use by the AI research community. Building on our previous work on AI Containment Problem we propose a number of guidelines which should help AI safety researchers to develop reliable sandboxing software for intelligent programs of all levels. Such safety container software will make it possible to study and analyze intelligent artificial agent while maintaining certain level of safety against information leakage, social engineering attacks and cyberattacks from within the container.