BackgroundInformation and communication technologies (ICTs) are often proposed as ‘technological fixes’ for problems facing healthcare. They promise to deliver services more quickly and cheaply. Yet research on the implementation of ICTs reveals a litany of delays, compromises and failures. Case studies have established that these technologies are difficult to embed in everyday healthcare.MethodsWe undertook an ethnographic comparative analysis of a single computer decision support system in three different settings to understand the implementation and everyday use of this technology which is designed to deal with calls to emergency and urgent care services. We examined the deployment of this technology in an established 999 ambulance call-handling service, a new single point of access for urgent care and an established general practice out-of-hours service. We used Normalization Process Theory as a framework to enable systematic cross-case analysis.ResultsOur data comprise nearly 500 hours of observation, interviews with 64 call-handlers, and stakeholders and documents about the technology and settings. The technology has been implemented and is used distinctively in each setting reflecting important differences between work and contexts. Using Normalisation Process Theory we show how the work (collective action) of implementing the system and maintaining its routine use was enabled by a range of actors who established coherence for the technology, secured buy-in (cognitive participation) and engaged in on-going appraisal and adjustment (reflexive monitoring).ConclusionsHuge effort was expended and continues to be required to implement and keep this technology in use. This innovation must be understood both as a computer technology and as a set of practices related to that technology, kept in place by a network of actors in particular contexts. While technologies can be ‘made to work’ in different settings, successful implementation has been achieved, and will only be maintained, through the efforts of those involved in the specific settings and if the wider context continues to support the coherence, cognitive participation, and reflective monitoring processes that surround this collective action. Implementation is more than simply putting technologies in place – it requires new resources and considerable effort, perhaps on an on-going basis.

Phase 1 results support the use of team-skills training to enhance CL group performance. The findings for Phase 2 suggest that these benefits may be lost if training groups are disrupted.

Background Whilst many health systems offer a range of urgent and emergency care services to deal with the need for unscheduled care, these can be problematic to navigate. Objective To explore how lay people make sense of urgent care provision and processes. Design Qualitative study, incorporating citizen panels and longitudinal semi‐structured qualitative interviews. Setting and Participants Two citizens’ panels, comprising purposively selected public populations—a group of regular users and a group of potentially marginalized users of urgent and emergency care. Semi‐structured interviews were conducted with 100 people, purposively sampled to include those over 75, aged 18‐26 years, and from East/Central Europe. A sub‐sample of 41 people received a second interview at +6‐12 months. Framework analysis was thematic and comparative, moving through coding to narrative and interpretive summaries. Findings and Discussion Participants narratives illuminated considerable uncertainty and confusion regarding urgent and emergency care provision which in part could be traced to the contingent nature of urgent and emergency care need. Accounts of emergency care provision were underpinned by strong moral positioning of appropriate help‐seeking, demarcating legitimate service use that echoed policy rhetoric, but did not necessarily translate into individual behaviour. People struggled to make sense of urgent care provision making navigating “appropriate” use problematic. Conclusions The focus on help‐seeking behaviour, rather than sense‐making, makes it difficult to move beyond the polarization of “appropriate” and “inappropriate” service use. A deeper analysis of sense‐making might shift the focus of attention and allow us to intervene to reshape understandings before this point.

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ObjectivesTo explore the success of the introduction of the National Health Service (NHS) 111 urgent care service and describe service activity in the period 2014–2016.DesignComparative mixed method case study of five NHS 111 service providers and analysis of national level routine data on activity and service use.Settings and dataOur primary research involved five NHS 111 sites in England. We conducted 356 hours of non-participant observation in NHS 111 call centres and the urgent care centres and, linked to these observations, held 6 focus group interviews with 47 call advisors, clinical and managerial staff. This primary research is augmented by a secondary analysis of routine data about the 44 NHS 111 sites in England contained in the NHS 111 Minimum Data Set made available by NHS England.ResultsOpinions vary depending on the criteria used to judge the success of NHS 111. The service has been rolled out across 44 sites. The 111 phone number is operational and the service has replaced its predecessor NHS Direct. This new service has led to changes in who does the work of managing urgent care demand, achieving significant labour substitution. Judged against internal performance criteria, the service appears not to meet some targets such as call answering times, but it has seen a steady increase in use over time. Patients appear largely satisfied with NHS 111, but the view from some stakeholders is more mixed. The impact of NHS 111 on other health services is difficult to assess and cost-effectiveness has not been established.ConclusionThe new urgent care service NHS 111 has been brought into use but its success against some key criteria has not been comprehensively proven.