People who are more avoidant of pathogens are more politically conservative, as are nations with greater parasite stress. In the current research, we test two prominent hypotheses that have been proposed as explanations for these relationships. The first, which is an intragroup account, holds that these relationships between pathogens and politics are based on motivations to adhere to local norms, which are sometimes shaped by cultural evolution to have pathogenneutralizing properties. The second, which is an intergroup account, holds that these same relationships are based on motivations to avoid contact with outgroups, who might pose greater infectious disease threats than ingroup members. Results from a study surveying 11,501 participants across 30 nations are more consistent with the intragroup account than with the intergroup account. National parasite stress relates to traditionalism (an aspect of conservatism especially related to adherence to group norms) but not to social dominance orientation (SDO; an aspect of conservatism especially related to endorsements of intergroup barriers and negativity toward ethnic and racial outgroups). Further, individual differences in pathogen-avoidance motives (i.e., disgust sensitivity) relate more strongly to traditionalism than to SDO within the 30 nations.political ideology | pathogens | disgust | culture | evolutionary psychology T he costs imposed by pathogens on their hosts have spurred the evolution of complex antipathogen defenses, many of which are behavioral (1, 2). In humans, such defenses range from the proximate avoidance of pathogen cues to the execution of complex rituals, often with far-reaching consequences (3). At the individual level, functionally specialized psychological mechanisms detect pathogen cues and motivate avoidance of physical contact with pathogens [e.g., via the emotion of disgust (4)]. These mechanisms, which have been collectively referred to as the behavioral immune system, influence, among other things, mate preferences (5, 6), dietary preferences (7), and person perception (8) (summarized in Significance Pathogens, and antipathogen behavioral strategies, affect myriad aspects of human behavior. Recent findings suggest that antipathogen strategies relate to political attitudes, with more ideologically conservative individuals reporting more disgust toward pathogen cues, and with higher parasite stress nations being, on average, more conservative. However, no research has yet adjudicated between two theoretical accounts proposed to explain these relationships between pathogens and politics. We find that national parasite stress and individual disgust sensitivity relate more strongly to adherence to traditional norms than they relate to support for barriers between social groups. These results suggest that the relationship between pathogens and politics reflects intragroup motivations more than intergroup motivations.

It has been proposed that humans possess an automatic system to represent mental states (‘implicit mentalizing’). The existence of an implicit mentalizing system has generated considerable debate however, centered on the ability of various experimental paradigms to demonstrate unambiguously such mentalizing. Evidence for implicit mentalizing has previously been provided by the ‘dot perspective task,’ where participants are slower to verify the number of dots they can see when an avatar can see a different number of dots. However, recent evidence challenged a mentalizing interpretation of this effect by showing it was unaltered when the avatar was replaced with an inanimate arrow stimulus. Here we present an extension of the dot perspective task using an invisibility cloaking device to render the dots invisible on certain trials. This paradigm is capable of providing unambiguous evidence of automatic mentalizing, but no such evidence was found. Two further well-powered experiments used opaque and transparent goggles to manipulate visibility but found no evidence of automatic mentalizing, nor of individual differences in empathy or perspective-taking predicting performance, contradicting previous studies using the same design. The results cast doubt on the existence of an implicit mentalizing system, suggesting that previous effects were due to domain-general processes.

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.

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The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for the effect of variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a ‘Mind-space’ framework; that minds, like faces, are represented within a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, intergroup relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.

Heterosexual age preferences have been extensively studied by evolutionary psychologists, social psychologists, and demographers. Much less is known about such preferences in homosexual men and women. Around two decades ago, D. T. Kenrick, R. C. Keefe, A. Bryan, A. Barr, and S. Brown (1995) examined heterosexual and homosexual mating preferences for age in men and women. Our study aimed to replicate these findings by examining age preferences in a larger UK online dating sample. Dating advertisements of 996 male and female heterosexuals and homosexuals were coded. Age preferences were assessed via generalized linear models with robust standard errors and bootstrapping. Results showed that the relation between own age and preferred age differed substantially between the groups. With increasing age, heterosexual men preferred younger partners. Older heterosexual men (> 50 years) exclusively sought (much) younger women than themselves, whereas younger heterosexual men sought both older and younger women. Male and female homosexuals followed this general trend of preferring increasingly younger mates with increasing age. However, they displayed a higher upper age tolerance and greater range of acceptable ages than both heterosexual men and women. Female heterosexuals' age preferences were distinct from the other groups, in that they displayed a male older norm with no substantial interest expressed in males younger than themselves. Our findings thus largely corroborate those of Kenrick et al. with some exceptions, such as a larger tolerance of age ranges in homosexual men and women compared to heterosexual men and women. Results are discussed with reference to the current literature on similarities and differences in heterosexual and homosexual mate preferences.

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In this Commentary article we critically assess the claims made by Schurz, Kronbichler, Weissengrubler, Surtees, Samson and Perner (2015) relating to the neural processes underlying theory of mind and visual perspective taking. They attempt to integrate research findings in these two areas of social neuroscience using a perspective taking task contrasting mentalistic agents (‗avatars'), with non-mentalistic control stimuli (‗arrows'), during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We support this endeavour whole-heartedly, agreeing that the integration of findings in these areas has been neglected in research on the social brain. However, we cannot find among the behavioural or neuroimaging data presented by Schurz et al. evidence supporting their claim of ‗implicit mentalizing' -the automatic ascription of mental states to another representing what they can see. Indeed, we suggest that neuroimaging methods may be ill-suited to address the existence of implicit mentalizing, and suggest that approaches utilizing neurostimulation methods are likely to be more successful.Keywords: Visual perspective taking; implicit mentalizing; theory of mind; domain-general; attentional orienting A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT AVATARS AND ARROWS IN THE BRAIN 3 Avatars and Arrows in the BrainIn a recent paper, Schurz et al. (2015) seek to integrate research on the neural mechanisms underlying theory of mind and visual perspective taking. They do this using a perspective taking task devised by Samson et al. (2010), involving ‗avatars', and a control condition that we added recently to this task (Santiesteban et al., 2014), involving arrows.We applaud their clear-sighted identification of a -conceptual gap‖ (Schurz et al., p. 386) in research on the social brain, and attempt to fill it using an avatar-arrow comparison inSamson et al.'s perspective taking task. However, as we shall explain in this commentary, we cannot find among the behavioural or neuroimaging data presented by Schurz et al.evidence of implicit mentalizing, rather than domain-general processing.In the dot perspective task, participants see an image of a room with discs or dots on the walls. In the centre of the room is a human figure, an avatar, who, because s/he is facing to the left or the right, can see either all, or only some, of the dots. Participants are asked to judge either how many dots they themselves can see: an explicit self-perspective judgement;or how many dots the avatar can see: an explicit other-perspective judgement. Importantly, because the avatar cannot always see the same number of dots as the participant themselves, this task allows researchers to address the question of whether the avatar's visual perspective is spontaneously processed even when judging self-perspective. On trials when the avatar can see all of the dots, the visual perspectives of the avatar and of the participant are consistent; whereas on trials when the avatar can see only some of the dots, the two visual perspectives are inconsistent. A...