Risk-based authentication (RBA) extends authentication mechanisms to make them more robust against account takeover attacks, such as those using stolen passwords. RBA is recommended by NIST and NCSC to strengthen password-based authentication, and is already used by major online services. Also, users consider RBA to be more usable than two-factor authentication and just as secure. However, users currently obtain RBA's high security and usability benefits at the cost of exposing potentially sensitive personal data (e.g., IP address or browser information). This conflicts with user privacy and requires to consider user rights regarding the processing of personal data.We outline potential privacy challenges regarding different attacker models and propose improvements to balance privacy in RBA systems. To estimate the properties of the privacy-preserving RBA enhancements in practical environments, we evaluated a subset of them with long-term data from 780 users of a real-world online service. Our results show the potential to increase privacy in RBA solutions. However, it is limited to certain parameters that should guide RBA design to protect privacy. We outline research directions that need to be considered to achieve a widespread adoption of privacy preserving RBA with high user acceptance.

Applied privacy research has so far focused mainly on consumer relations in private life. Privacy in the context of employment relationships is less well studied, although it is subject to the same legal privacy framework in Europe. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has strengthened employees’ right to privacy by obliging that employers provide transparency and intervention mechanisms. For such mechanisms to be effective, employees must have a sound understanding of their functions and value. We explored possible boundaries by conducting a semi-structured interview study with 27 office workers in Germany and elicited mental models of the right to informational self-determination, which is the European proxy for the right to privacy. We provide insights into (1) perceptions of different categories of data, (2) familiarity with the legal framework regarding expectations for privacy controls, and (3) awareness of data processing, data flow, safeguards, and threat models. We found that legal terms often used in privacy policies used to describe categories of data are misleading. We further identified three groups of mental models that differ in their privacy control requirements and willingness to accept restrictions on their privacy rights. We also found ignorance about actual data flow, processing, and safeguard implementation. Participants’ mindsets were shaped by their faith in organizational and technical measures to protect privacy. Employers and developers may benefit from our contributions by understanding the types of privacy controls desired by office workers and the challenges to be considered when conceptualizing and designing usable privacy protections in the workplace.

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