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In order to measure the strength of the parties in each state, the Major Party Index (MPI) was built by averaging the results of the six major elections that take place in the fifty states. This index allows us to describe the absolute and comparative partisan leaning of each state in each election and identify trends of party strength over time within individual states, among regions, and within the nation as a whole. The MPI sheds considerable light on three general developments: (1) a national change from Democratic dominance in the 1980s to a Republican edge by 2002, (2) significant regional realignments in the South and New England, and (3) a strong trend toward greater consistency between partisan voting at the federal and state levels.

According to Tocqueville, the most important determinant of the character of any society is its political culture (moeurs). A political culture is shaped not only by sociological conditions and laws, but also, in modern times, by ideas propounded by intellectuals. In Tocqueville's day, two dominant schools of thought were contending for influence over the public mind in Europe: philosophe rationalism and traditionalism. Neither one of these schools, Tocqueville argued, promoted a political culture that could reconcile liberty and democracy. Tocqueville conceived his “new political science” as an alternative to these schools that could meet this challenge. Unlike the opposing schools, the new political science could not be propagated directly as an ideology. Its implementation relied on an indirect strategy—using institutions to inculcate certain “mental habits” among the citizens. This in turn called for ways of limiting the role of intellectuals in influencing political culture.

Using election results as our point of departure, this article places the 2016 presidential election in historical perspective. Trump's victory was an "expected" outcome, as races following two-terms of one party rule usually go to the opposition party. Trump also ran close to fellow Republicans competing for Congress despite his unusual relationship with many of those in the party he captured. Trump's victory in the presidential contest proved remarkably economical. He lost most of his votes relative to Romney in 2012 in places where it did not matter, while his opponent ran up the score in the states she already had locked down. We further measure the increasing geographic concentration of each major party's electoral support and consider how this relates to the controversy over the Electoral College.

This essay explores the scope of the Democratic Party's victory in the 2008 elections by comparing it to other U.S. elections since 1896. Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis: (1) that Obama's personal victory, though significant, was far from being massive, or even unusual, by historical standards; (2) that the Democratic congressional victory of 2008, relative to the midterm election of 2006, falls in the upper range of congressional victories in a presidential year; (3) that the Democrats' victory becomes more impressive in light of its reversal of the 2004 election, which represented the high-water mark for Republicans since 1928. The essay also briefly considers whether and in what sense the Democrats' victory might have inaugurated a party realignment.

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A ccording to political scientists of the last generation, party competition was an essential feature of any form of popular government. How dismayed they would be, therefore, to learn from contemporary students of American politics that our parties are "decomposing" and that our national electoral process is increasingly taking on the characteristics of nonpartisan competition. While the labels of the two traditional parties continue to exist, the institutions bearing these labels have lost many of their previous functions. Parties no longer structure the voting behavior of large numbers of citizens. They have ceased to play a major role in constraining presidential decision-making, and presidents now place little reliance on them in their efforts to generate public support for policy initiatives. Perhaps most important of all, party organizations have lost their influence in determining the outcome of presidential nominations. Under the "open" nominating process that has emerged since 1968, the races have for all practical purposes become plebiscitary contests among the individual contenders. Candidates create large personal campaign organizations and devise their own programs and electoral strategies, very much as if they were establishing national parties of their own. These personalistic features of the nomination contests continue into the final election stage, as the parties become the extensions of the organizations of the victorious nominees.