Abstract. This article contributes to the ongoing and growing scholarly conversation concerning how best to define the term "genocide" following Raphael Lemkin's coining of the term in 1944. The article first shows that the Convention definition ratified in Paris in 1948 was intended solely for juridical purposes and does not reflect Lemkin's deeper understanding of genocide. It then surveys a range of scholarship after Lemkin that argues for alternative definitions of term or even calls for jettisoning the term altogether. While it is acknowledged that a clear definition is imperative in a juridical context, it is argued that there are problems and even dangers in demanding definitional precision. For purposes of coming to terms with the multi-dimensionality and complexities of genocidal events or the genocidal process, Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance provides an alternative way of seeing genocide that avoids the dangers of definition.
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Genocide scholars are of course familiar with the work of John K. Roth who has authored, coauthored, and edited numerous volumes on the Holocaust and other genocides. His most recent book, The Failures of Ethics: Confronting the Holocaust, Genocide, and Other Mass Atrocities, may well be his most insightful work yet. It is a work that deserves a careful reading by all of us in the field of Genocide Studies, irrespective of disciplinary lens. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that he is resolute in confronting the horrors of genocide. He quotes Emmanuel Levinas to the effect that "The Holocaust of the Jewish people under the reign of Hitler…seems to me the paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, in which evil appears in its diabolical horror." 1 He concludes his chapter on "God's Failures" with a call for "no more theodicy." Roth explores the possibility that in an era of postmodern relativism the Holocaust might well be a "negative absolute." 2 And following Jean Améry, Roth takes to heart the insight that the Holocaust and other atrocities including rape and torture mark "the destruction of trust in the world." 3 Yet like Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel-Roth acknowledges a deep debt to Wiesel-Roth refuses to abandon hope. At the conclusion of Part I (of II) Roth writes: 'And yet. .. and yet,' Elie Wiesel has said, 'this is the key expression of my work.' That outlook should also be a key response to the failures of ethics, including God's failures, because life persists, history continues, and they embody so much that is good and precious, so much that must not be abandoned-perhaps even God?-lest failure is compounded to the point of no return. 4
Scholarship in the multidisciplinary field of genocide studies often emphasizes body counts and the number of biological deaths as a way of measuring and comparing the severity and scope of individual genocides. The prevalence of this way of framing genocide is problematic insofar it risks marginalizing the voices and experiences of victims who may not succumb to biological death but nevertheless suffer the loss of family members and other loved ones, and suffer the destruction of relationships, as well as the foundational institutions that give rise to and sustain those relationships. The concept of social death, which Claudia Card offers as the central evil of genocide, marks a radical shift in conceptualizing genocide and provides space for recovering the marginalized voices of many who suffer the evils of genocide but do not suffer biological death. Here her concept of social death is explored, defended, and criticized.
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