This paper addresses the question: How does implementation influence the effectiveness of mandatory welfare-to-work programs? Data from three large-scale, multi-site random assignment experiments were pooled; quantitative measures of program implementation were constructed; and multilevel statistical modeling was used to examine the relationship between program implementation and effects on short-term client earnings. Individual-level data were analyzed for 69,399 sample members and group-level implementation data were analyzed for 59 local programs. Findings indicate that, other things being equal, earnings effects are increased by: an emphasis on quick client employment, an emphasis on personalized client attention, staff caseloads that do not get too large, and limited use of basic education. Findings also show that mandatory welfare-to-work programs can be effective for many types of people, and that focusing on clients who are especially job-ready (or not) does not have a consistent influence on a program's effectiveness. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management

This paper addresses the question: How does implementation influence the effectiveness of mandatory welfare-to-work programs? Data from three large-scale, multi-site random assignment experiments were pooled; quantitative measures of program implementation were constructed; and multilevel statistical modeling was used to examine the relationship between program implementation and effects on short-term client earnings. Individual-level data were analyzed for 69,399 sample members and group-level implementation data were analyzed for 59 local programs. Findings indicate that, other things being equal, earnings effects are increased by: an emphasis on quick client employment, an emphasis on personalized client attention, staff caseloads that do not get too large, and limited use of basic education. Findings also show that mandatory welfare-to-work programs can be effective for many types of people, and that focusing on clients who are especially job-ready (or not) does not have a consistent influence on a program's effectiveness.

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Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards was the first conditional cash transfer, randomized controlled trial for low-income families in the United States. From 2007 to 2010, Family Rewards offered 2,377 New York City families cash transfers that were conditional upon their investments in education, preventive health care, and parental employment. Their health and other outcomes were compared to those of a control group of 2,372 families. The experiment led to a modest improvement in health insurance coverage and a large increase in the use of preventive dental care. It improved parents' perception of their own health and levels of hope, mainly through improvements in reported financial well-being. While the program's impacts on physical health were weaker, our study might not have captured effects on chronic disease risk that take longer to accrue. In the context of New York City's operating social-safety-net programs, conditional cash transfers may have led to positive, albeit modest, improvements in the health of poor families.