Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to understand how information technology (IT) is used to enhance supply chain performance. Design/methodology/approach -A large-scale survey and semi-structured interviews were used to collect industry data. Findings -Two distinct dimensions to information sharing -connectivity and willingness -are identified and analyzed. Both dimensions are found to impact operational performance and to be critical to the development of a real information sharing capability. However, many companies are found to have placed most of their emphasis on connectivity, often overlooking the willingness construct. As a result, information sharing seldom delivers on its promise to enable the creation of the cohesive supply chain team. Research limitations -Despite the extensive data collection, the research represents a snapshot of practice. Replication from a longitudinal perspective would help define how IT is evolving to enable supply chain management. Practical implications -A roadmap is presented to help guide IT development and investment decisions. Originality/value -The research presents a two-by-two matrix to help managers and academics understand the related nature of connectivity and willingness. A roadmap is presented to help guide IT development and investment decisions.

We survey 336 chief financial officers (CFOs) to compare practice to theory in the areas of initial public offering (IPO) motivation, timing, underwriter selection, underpricing, signaling, and the decision to remain private. We find the primary motivation for going public is to facilitate acquisitions. CFOs base IPO timing on overall market conditions, are well informed regarding expected underpricing, and feel underpricing compensates investors for taking risk. The most important positive signal is past historical earnings, followed by underwriter certification. CFOs have divergent opinions about the IPO process depending on firm-specific characteristics. Finally, we find the main reason for remaining private is to preserve decision-making control and ownership. Copyright 2006 by The American Finance Association.

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Lockups are agreements made by insiders of stock-issuing firms to abstain from selling shares for a specified period of time after the issue. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that lockups are a bonding solution to a moral hazard problem and not a signaling solution to an adverse selection problem. We challenge this conclusion theoretically and empirically. In our model, insiders of good firms signal by putting and keeping (locking up) their money where their mouths are. Our model yields two comparative statics: lockups should be shorter when a firm is i) more transparent and/or ii) more risky. Using a sample of 4,013 initial public offerings and 3,279 seasoned equity offerings between 1988 and 1999, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions.