This paper investigates knowledge hoarding, defined as an individual’s deliberate and strategic concealment of information, and perceived hoarding, defined as coworkers' beliefs that an individual is engaged in hoarding. We hypothesize that knowledge hoarding increases an individual’s job performance by enhancing bargaining power and influence, whereas perceived hoarding decreases the individual’s job performance because coworkers withdraw social support. We further suggest that knowledge hoarding and perceived hoarding are both detrimental to unit performance because they hurt work-related interactions and impair the unit’s ability to respond quickly to problems. Using a sample of 297 individuals embedded in 41 units in the U.S. Forest Service, we find that the positive effect of hoarding on individual performance is mediated by bargaining power, whereas the negative effect of perceived hoarding on individual performance is mediated by social support. In addition, individual hoarding and perceived hoarding both diminish unit performance. Collectively, our results reveal the mixed fortunes that befall individuals and their organizations as a result of knowledge hoarding and suspected hoarding activity.

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This article examines how the fulfillment of obligations viewed as essential to an individual’s relationship with his or her employer (i.e., the psychological contract) affects attributions of friendship and influence within the organization. Drawing on social exchange theory and self-categorization theory, we hypothesize that individuals who fulfill relational obligations will receive more friendship nominations from others in the organization, whereas individuals who fulfill ideological obligations will receive more influence nominations. In contrast, we hypothesize that those who fulfill transactional obligations will receive fewer friendship and influence nominations. We also predict that individuals who hold similar beliefs about their relationship with the organization will be more likely to nominate similar coworkers as friends or as influential in the organization, and that ideological contract similarity may provide a more compelling rationale for influence nomination than transactional or relational contract similarity. We tested our framework in two samples and find support for these general hypotheses. Our findings suggest that positions of status and influence in ideologically oriented organizations may accrue to “true believers,” i.e., those whose contracts with the organization are construed in ideological terms. Accordingly, this study has important implications for research on psychological contracts and social influence.