International Political Economy (IPE) textbooks tend to present the concept of a clear state-market dichotomy as the disciplinary mainstream. Yet we argue that a critical consensus has emerged around the mutual constitution of states and markets.Underpinning this is the Polanyian thesis that economic activities are always politically embedded. However, we claim that this notion of state-market mutual constitution is inadequate to grasp the peculiarities of the capitalist political economy. While capitalist market relations are underpinned by states, they take on an autonomous, dominating logic that limits states' agency. Concretely, by reproducing international monetary relations, states accidentally contribute to the establishment of world labour productivity averages that force them to boost national competitiveness in order to keep pace with world market standards. In place of the notion of mutual constitution, then, we offer Marx's concept of alienation as a theory of a form of social relations that have escaped the control of the institutions that produce them. The challenge of state governancereflected in the canon of liberal thoughtis to reconcile the impersonal imperatives of world market relations with the creation of a legitimate national political project, which we term the politics of governing alienation.
Within the financialisation literature, a number of approaches identify the coexistence of financial expansion and productive stagnation. Yet there is no consensus on which direction causality operates between these two phenomena. This impasse has been widened by the lack of attention paid to the role of statecraft strategies in mediating possible causal mechanisms.This article contributes to rectifying this shortcoming by focusing on the governance advantages granted to states through financial deregulation. By presenting archival evidence on Britain's 1971 Competition and Credit Control deregulation, this article lends support to financialisation accounts that argue that weaknesses in the productive economy spurred financial expansion, yet it also indicates that the state's desire for depoliticised forms of governance played a crucial role in mediating this relationship. This further suggests that IPE should focus on the strategic manner in which states relate to markets.
Meeting the Paris climate goals requires the global economy’s urgent decarbonization. States and intergovernmental bodies insist that this should be pursued via a tremendous spike in private investment in renewable power – encouraged and coordinated by states. However, this renewable investment boom will have to swim against the current of the stagnation of the world economy since the 1970s, characterized by weak rates of investment and growth. Undertaking decarbonization in this context presents unique political economy dilemmas. Firstly, although slow growth helps to reduce carbon emissions by lowering energy use, it simultaneously impedes energy efficiency gains. Secondly, the stagnant state of global industry militates against its adoption of expensive decarbonized industrial processes. Thirdly, while most renewable power sources have failed to attract sufficient investment, those that have expanded rapidly – particularly solar photovoltaic – have tended to exhaust their growth potential due to falling prices and profitability. Finally, economic stagnation has destabilized political institutions, exerting pressures on governments to stimulate growth regardless of the environmental implications. States must navigate these intractable dilemmas as they strategize to decarbonize the downturn.
The categories of productive and unproductive labour have been a source of contention among Marxist scholars since Marx first committed them to paper. This article will offer a critique of both the orthodox and autonomist approaches to this issue, arguing that they constitute transhistorical and analytically inadequate interpretations. In contrast, a social form approach to productive and unproductive labour provides a substantive definition of these categories in relation to the commodity form, and brings class struggle back to the forefront in a theoretically consistent manner.
This chapter provides a historical overview of the profitability crisis that undermined the postwar economic boom, gave rise to the phenomenon of stagflation, and ultimately drove the financial liberalizations explored in this book. This chapter puts forward a novel historical categorization of British stagflation, by identifying two distinct phases within Britain’s experience of the global profitability crisis. The first, from 1967 to 1977, was characterized by low rates of profit, rising inflation, and repeated current account imbalances that resulted in currency crises. The second, from 1977 to 1983, still saw low profitability and high inflation, but the rising price of sterling ensured that there were no sterling crises. The chapter then details how governments combined governing strategies of depoliticized discipline and palliation in different ways during these two periods of acute crisis in order to navigate the contradictory imperatives of global competitiveness and domestic legitimacy. Policies of financial liberalization constituted attempts to support these strategies.
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