Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability.
Cost plan has an important role in construction projects. Every part of activites need cost from preliminary to hand over the project. As an owner representative to control the budget project, a quantity surveyor has to prepare an owner estimate. The owner estimate is a reference to evaluate the quotation in bidding process. The accuracy of calculation owner estimate is very important. Cost-based pricing is one of the strategies in the bidding process, the formula of quotation is cost of the project plus mark up. In the process of bidding, contractors have their consideration of internal and external factors in every project, so they produced a different value of mark up. Many experts made formula for bidding strategy, in Friedman’s and Gates’s formula the value of mark up is determined by probability of winning in every contractor. Purpose of this research is to determine the amount of mark up by Friedman’s and Gates’s formula. The result of analysis with Friedman’s and Gates’s formula is more or less at seven percent of mark up. The result is determined by number and type of competitors.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.