This study examines international differences in the asymmetric timeliness of accounting earnings by modelling international exposure to different jurisdictions as a firm-specific effect, using an index of regulatory complexity that relates to conditions in each of the capital markets in which the firm's equity is listed. The companies investigated are those with shares cross-listed on European stock exchanges, some of which are also listed in New York. Variation across jurisdictions and markets with respect to earnings timeliness and conservatism can be explained in part as an interaction of market effects and regulatory effects, with some evidence of opposition between the two, and the sensitivity of earnings to stock price changes shows a common, converging trend towards greater accounting conservatism in Europe. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004.

This paper presents evidence that corporate governance quality measured by (1) the board size and (2) the fraction of directors that serve on more corporate boards, influences the market value of firms. The analysis is based in Italy, a country that is characterized by family and concentrated ownership, low legal protection of investors and pyramidal firm structures. Our empirical results suggest that the level of ‘busy-ness’ of corporate directors as a measure of board effectiveness has a significant influence on firm’s market performance. By contrast, we find limited evidence that board size has a substantial impact on the market valuation, except in small and medium enterprises and in some specific industry sectors

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.Permanent repository link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13679/ Link to published version: http://dx. AbstractIn this paper, we investigate how firm reporting incentives and institutional factors affect accounting quality in firms from 26 countries. We exploit a unique multicountry setting where firms are required to comply with the same set of international reporting standards. We develop an approach of cross-country comparisons allowing for differences between firms within a country and we investigate the relative importance of country-versus firm-specific factors in explaining accounting quality. We find that financial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong monitoring mechanisms by means of ownership concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing, external financing needs, and leverage. Instability of business operations, existence of losses, and lack of transparent disclosure negatively affect the quality of accounting information. At the country level, we observe better accounting quality for firms from regulatory environments with stronger institutions, higher levels of economic development, greater business sophistication, and more globalized markets. More importantly, we find that firm-specific incentives play a greater role in explaining accounting quality than countrywide factors. This evidence suggests that institutional factors shape the firm's specific incentives that influence reporting quality. Our findings support the view that the global adoption of a single set of accounting standards in isolation is not likely to lead to more comparable and transparent financial statements unless the institutional conditions and the firmspecific reporting incentives also change.

This study examines the interactive influence of ownership and institutional arrangements such as investor protection and corporate governance on the incorporation of value shocks in earnings expectations. In particular, the study provides estimates of the reversal of accounting conservatism in analysts' forecasts, and the empirical evidence that is reported in the paper shows how the institutional arrangements underpinning accounting affect the way in which earnings expectations reflect good and bad news, conditionally on ownership structure. The timely inclusion of bad news is systematically lower for firms with closely held shares in jurisdictions with weaker investor protection or without well defined governance mechanisms.Stronger investor protection and a greater separation between supervision and management each tends to mitigate the adverse effects of ownership concentration on accounting conservatism, and there is evidence that stricter corporate governance practices can substitute for weaknesses in investor protection provision through the law.2

This study focuses on the relation between the cost of equity capital and earnings expectations when the properties of accounting that determine earnings vary across different regulatory regimes. More particularly, it addresses the European setting where different types of GAAP regime have continued to function in the presence of the gradual harmonization of the underlying legal framework, and where the adoption of internationally recognised accounting standards by certain firms has anticipated the requirement for International Financial Reporting Standards. On the basis of estimates of the cost of equity that are implied by analysts' earnings forecasts, the paper provides evidence that financial market integration may have already contributed to mitigating the economic consequences of accounting diversity, and that switching to IFRS could have a short lived impact on capital markets. Moreover, based on firm level transparency and disclosure rankings provided by Standard and Poor's, it is shown how the quality of financial reporting conditions the implied cost of equity under different GAAP.

This is the submitted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Standard and Poor's, we show how disclosure and accruals jointly affect the earnings expectations that are incorporated in current stock returns, depending not only on the magnitude, but also on their duration, i.e. whether they affect current or non-current operations, and their sign, i.e. whether they increase net operating assets (a positive net accrual) or decrease net operating assets (a negative net accrual). Permanent

This study focuses on the relation between the cost of equity capital and earnings expectations when the properties of accounting that determine earnings vary across different regulatory regimes. More particularly, it addresses the European setting where different types of GAAP regime have continued to function in the presence of the gradual harmonization of the underlying legal framework, and where the adoption of internationally recognised accounting standards by certain firms has anticipated the requirement for International Financial Reporting Standards. On the basis of estimates of the cost of equity that are implied by analysts' earnings forecasts, the paper provides evidence that financial market integration may have already contributed to mitigating the economic consequences of accounting diversity, and that switching to IFRS could have a short lived impact on capital markets. Moreover, based on firm level transparency and disclosure rankings provided by Standard and Poor's, it is shown how the quality of financial reporting conditions the implied cost of equity under different GAAP.

No abstract