1 Italo TestaTranslated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of "second nature" and "recognition". To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper ro the theory ofHegelian and post-Hegelian Ane/'kennttng. 1he solution strategy I propose is signilìcant also in terms ofbringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of "space of reasons" that sterns from the Hegelian concept of "Spirit". I thus broach the notion of "second nature" as a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Ane/'kenntlng and for a rethinking of the "space of reasons" within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the noveltics introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between lìrst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levds. I then retum lo the qucstion of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makcs lo the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalncss.Keywords: recognition, second nature, Hegel, Brandom, McDowell 1. Introduction: the background of the question The aim of this paper is to bring into focus the notions of second nature and recognition (Anerkennung) in their reciproca! connection, both historically and theoretically. Let me begin, then, by outlining some premises for the discourse I wish to develop here. 342 ITALO TESTA Recognition revisitedA generaI objective of my study consists in elaborating a renewed vision of the theory of Anerkennung by broaching a distinction between two levels of recognition.1.1.1 A problem in the theory of recognition The broaching of this distinction is justified by the need to solve a problem that emerges in the theory of recognition, which we can illustrate by clarif}ring two sides of a dilemma connected with it:• Circularity: recognition appears to presuppose itself. A version of this problem is the one originally noted by Fichte and later reproposed by Dieter Henrich, 2 for which if reRexive self-consciousness constitutes itself through the process of recognition then to recognize reRexively I must already have a pre-reRexive familiarity with myself. 3 Thus the recognitive theory of self-consciousness, to avoid falling into a vicious circle, apparently ought to renounce explanation of the self-referential structure of self-consciousness and admit the primitivity of a notion of subjective self-reference of a prereRexive type. 1he German word Reflexioll indicates in Hegel the logica! structuce of self-reference. Thc tcnn isapplied by Hegel to natural proeesses that for an external obscrvcr cxhibit a form of self-referenee; at a higher lcve! it is applied to eonsciousness, llnderstood as inunediate Reflexion ( 108), a form of self-referenee aeeompanied for itselfby self-awareness: henee as Reflex...

In this article I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process of habituation. Habit ontology leads to a social philosophy that is not merely descriptive, since it involves a critical redescription of the social world. I will argue that a habit-modeled social ontology is critical insofar as it includes an account of social transformation and of the inevitability of social conflict. Such an understanding is based on a diagnosis of social pathologies of our form of life and includes an account of the experience of domination. Accordingly, it is described as a matter of an imbalance of recognition that embodies subjugating patterns and is seen from the critical perspective of freedom understood as emancipation from oppression. This leads to a reconstruction of the genesis of critical attitudes from life's processes of habituation, which leads to an extended naturalist account of social authority.

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On 11 th March 2020, the Director-General of The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic. From this date, in Italy as in most parts of the world, life dramatically changed in many aspects: smart working and remote teaching became familiar words, while students and teachers at all educational levels, from primary school to university, had to face sudden changes and new challenges. Emergency remote teaching became widespread, and new methodologies to deliver classes and courses were adopted by educational institutions.In this paper, we focus on the impact of the remote learning experience on university students, in particular, engineering students enrolled at Politecnico di Milano. Subjects recruited from all engineering courses, from the first to the fifth year, were asked to fill in a multidimensional survey. Respondents participated in the study voluntarily and more than 3,000 students completed the entire survey. Overall, 60 items about the participants' perceptions about the challenges of emergency remote teaching, compared with the pre-Covid-19 usual in-presence teaching were included.The survey addressed 6 dimensions: Organization of the emergency remote Teaching, Subjective Well Being, Metacognition, Self-Efficacy, Identity, and Socio-Demographic information. Preliminary results show significant differences in the students' perceptions concerning the following three factors: the effectiveness and the organization of the courses, the change in the university students' evaluation of their instructors, and the change in the university students' perception of difficulties in the switch from in-presence instruction to online learning. Data analysis also suggests a relevant impact of an emergency remote teaching on students' perceived Metacognition and Self Efficacy.

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I tackle the definition of the relation between first and second nature while examining some problems with McDowell's conception. This, in the first place, will bring out the need to extend the notion of second nature to the social dimension, understanding it not just as `inner' second nature — individual mind — but also as `outer' second nature — objective spirit. In the second place the dialectical connection between these two notions of second nature will point the way to a critical use of the concept itself, which will link up with a theory of reification. Furthermore, I shall endeavor to fit my reflection into the problematic constellation of critical theory: my analysis in fact rests on the question whether, within a critical theory, the philosophy of nature can be recaptured today, in such a way as to give meaning to the very notion of socio-philosophical criticism of reality.

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