Objective: Recent studies show that violence is difficult to accomplish and only occurs under particular situational circumstances-but does this also apply to protests in authoritarian regimes? This article investigates the microdynamics of violence during the antiregime protests in Tunisia, Syria, and Bahrain. Method: The argument is based on visual data analysis of video footage of violent and nonviolent interactions from the uprisings in Bahrain, Tunisia, and Syria, as well as human rights reports, interviews with participants of demonstrations, and observation of a demonstration. Results: The article shows how violence by the state and protesters occurred when the perpetrator attacked from afar/above, from behind, at night, or from a vehicle, or attacked the outnumbered. In a few situations, violence was avoided when protesters confronted the security forces face to face. Conclusions: The article supports Randall Collins's argument ( 2008) that situational conditions allowing the perpetrator to overcome barriers of tension and fear are necessary for violence to occur, even in authoritarian regimes. However, situational dynamics can explain how but not why violence occurs, and Collins's guidelines for activists of how to avoid police violence are no panacea in authoritarian regimes.

The article analyzes the micro‐sociological dynamics of civil resistance in the uprisings in Bahrain and Tunisia (2010‐11). It argues that the Tunisian uprising succeeded because regime repression generated solidarity and unity among diverse groups in society, while the regime increasingly suffered from miscommunication, mistrust, and increasing disobedience. In Bahrain, the movement initially enjoyed a high degree of unity and solidarity mobilizing against regime atrocities, but as the regime allowed protesters to demonstrate with little interference for a month, internal divisions emerged. Whereas Tunisian protesters launched a united escalation at a time of opponent weakness, factions of Bahraini activists escalated at a time of increasing division in the movement and society as a whole which both provoked and enabled a crackdown by the regime. Conclusively, success or failure of an uprising depends on a movement and a regime's ability to maintain unity respectively, as well as the timing of escalatory actions.

With the unprecedented COVID-lockdown in 2020, most peace diplomacy turned virtual. This represented a temporary loss of many of the usual practices and provided an opportunity to examine virtual diplomacy as well as all that was lost in the absence of physicality. Based on interviews with parties and mediators involved in the peace processes of Syria and Yemen, we analyse the affordances of virtual and physical meetings respectively. Particularly, virtual meetings condition peace diplomacy in terms of broadening accessibility, putting confidentiality at risk, allowing for higher frequency of meetings, often disrupting interaction, but also in some instances equalizing it. Physical meetings on the other hand allow for bodily presence, for spending extended periods of time together, for reconciliatory interaction and creating informal space. Most importantly, the transition to virtual meetings demonstrated the missing sense of peace, a notion we develop to capture the visceral dimension of physical meetings, conceptualized to include understanding, togetherness and trust. We argue that neither virtual nor physical diplomacy should be discarded and discuss strategies of how to work around the missing sense of peace in virtual diplomacy and the potential of hybrid solutions exploiting the potential of both formats.

Nonviolent resistance is a powerful tool but can also turn into civil war when repressed. Based on interviews with activists from Bahrain, Tunisia, and Syria and experts on nonviolent resistance, this article investigates how activists can reduce violence in demonstrations. Five approaches to countering regime violence are proposed: (a) disrupting violent action, (b) constructing dilemma situations, (c) avoiding direct confrontation, (d) inviting civilian peacekeepers, and (d) respecting the opponent's traditions, as well as six ways of reducing activist violence: (a) delegitimizing violence, (b) managing material availability, (c) managing emotions, (d) providing alternatives, (e) changing practices of violence, and (f) enhancing cohesion.

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