We analyse discretionary fiscal responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. We distinguish policies for three phases of the pandemic: (1) acute overall disruption, (2) initial recovery phase and (3) the longer term. We analyse measures already taken in (1) and consider measures relevant for (2). We distinguish between lump-sum subsidies, such as deferral of tax payments, which may ease financial constraints, and measures which intentionally affect incentives. We also identify factors that are important given the short-term nature of the measures.

We exploit a 2008 UK policy reform that increased the tax incentives for R&D in medium-sized enterprises relative to large ones, to overcome the endogeneity of exposure to such tax credits. We estimate a difference-in-difference design on the universe of corporation tax filings in the United Kingdom, combined with other datasets. We find a positive and significant impact of tax credits for R&D, implying a user-cost elasticity estimate of around −1.6. This magnitude implies around $1 in additional private R&D spending per dollar foregone in tax revenue. (JEL H25, H32, K34, L25, O32)

This paper evaluates the effect of tax incentives for research and development (R&D) on R&D spending and employment of R&D staff in a quasi-experimental setting. To do this, I exploit an exogenous reform in UK R&D tax policy, which changed the definition of an SME from firms with fewer than 250 employees to those with fewer than 500 employees. I use the UK Business Enterprise Research and Development Survey (BERD), for which companies do not have an incentive to relabel their ordinary employees or spending as R&D. I find that R&D tax incentives help to increase R&D spending at the company level; this translates to a user cost elasticity between −0.88 and −1.18. Further, the additional R&D generated through the tax relief can be attributed entirely to an increase in the number of R&D employees in the companies' workforce. Together, these results challenge a common narrative on the role of R&D tax incentives.

This paper estimates the intensive and extensive-margin tax-price elasticities of giving using UK administrative tax return data, exploiting variation from a large tax reform. Using a variety of estimation methods and new instruments for the tax-price of giving, we find an intensive-margin elasticity of about-0.25 and an extensive-margin elasticity of-0.1, yielding a total elasticity of about-0.35. These estimates mask considerable heterogeneity: high-income individuals respond more on the intensive margin, while the extensive-margin response is stronger for low-income taxpayers. We then derive new conditions to evaluate the welfare consequences of changes in the subsidy to donations. This analysis shows that these elasticities can only be rationalized as being optimal if the UK government places a large enough value on providing warm-glow opportunities for UK donors.

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