Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders' ownership and leverage. At low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake in capital and to resist unfriendly takeovers attempts. When ownership reaches a certain point, controlling shareholders' objectives further converge with those of outside shareholders. Moreover, financial distress will prompt controlling shareholders to reduce the firm's leverage ratio. Empirically, it is shown that the inflection point where the sign of the relationship between ownership and debt changes is around 40%. Debts may help in curbing private appropriation and appears also as a governance variable.

No abstract

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders' ownership and leverage. At low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake in capital and to resist unfriendly takeovers attempts. When ownership reaches a certain point, controlling shareholders' objectives further converge with those of outside shareholders. Moreover, financial distress will prompt controlling shareholders to reduce the firm's leverage ratio. Empirically, it is shown that the inflection point where the sign of the relationship between ownership and debt changes is around 40%. Debts may help in curbing private appropriation and appears also as a governance variable.JEL: G3/ G32/G34

La diversité et l’inclusion sont de plus en plus considérées comme le moteur de croissance et de prospérité. Dans ce contexte, les femmes entrepreneures sont peu à peu plus nombreuses dans le secteur des petites entreprises. Malgré l’importance de l’entrepreneuriat féminin comme vecteur de croissance économique mondiale, les femmes entrepreneures sont plus susceptibles que leurs homologues hommes d’affronter plusieurs entraves à la création, à la survie et à la croissance de leur entreprise. Plus particulièrement, les difficultés d’accès au financement restent un des principaux obstacles auxquels elles font face. Bosse et Taylor (2012) désignent ce phénomène par le second plafond de verre (second glass ceiling). Le présent article s’intéresse aux inégalités en matière de financement traditionnel entre les femmes et les hommes d’affaires. Il examine dans quelle mesure le financement participatif permet d’éliminer ou, tout au moins, de réduire le biais de genre dans le cadre de financement traditionnel. Au moyen d’une revue de la littérature théorique et empirique, cet article tente de répondre aux questions suivantes : Pourquoi les femmes entrepreneures font-elles face à des contraintes financières lorsqu’elles ont recours au financement traditionnel? Le financement participatif constitue-t-il une option de financement innovante pour stimuler l’entrepreneuriat féminin?