Employee-owned businesses have recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest as possible 'alternatives' to the somewhat tarnished image of conventional investorowned capitalist firms. Within the context of global economic crisis, such alternatives seem newly attractive. This is somewhat ironic because, for more than a century, academic literature on employee-owned businesses has been dominated by the

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The academic literature argues that managers, with their resources and capabilities, constitute a source of competitive advantage for companies, but that cooperatives generally have difficulties attracting and retaining competent managers. The present study examines the special efforts made in the creation and development of cooperative managers via corporate training centres in the Mondragon Cooperative Group. The fieldwork that supports this research is a qualitative study based on a series of in-depth interviews with 12 people in charge of Mondragon's training structure. This study confirms that Mondragon's cooperatives have overcome the difficulties common to other cooperatives in attracting and retaining valuable managers. The study also confirmed that Mondragon's management training policy, based on its corporate training centres, is internally perceived as a source of competitive advantages to the cooperatives in the attraction, development and retention of managers.

The article analyses governance difficulties at Fagor Electrodomésticos, for decades the world’s largest industrial cooperative, and sheds light on how the cooperative model and governance might have contributed to the firm’s bankruptcy. The case study examines how the cooperative model influenced the speed and quality of decision making. The roles of the main cooperative governing bodies (the General Assembly, Governing Council and Social Council) are evaluated and their limitations to effectively supervise and work with management to make difficult strategic decisions. Several governance improvement measures are proposed in order to help other large cooperatives combine democratic control and economically sound governance.

The article analyzes the interaction between employee ownership, HRM policies and practices, and HRM outcomes in what was the world's biggest industrial worker cooperative for decades, and now defunct, Fagor Electrodomésticos. Using longitudinal internal data and detailed interviews with key stakeholders, this paper sheds light on how employee ownership conditioned HRM policies. HRM outcomes—such as job satisfaction and absenteeism—are also analyzed over a long period of time. Chronic nepotism when recruiting new members, failures in the training policy, impoverished and Taylorist working systems, and reverse dominance hierarchies are analyzed as factors that increased free riding and caused low satisfaction and the disengagement of working members. This case study contributes to the literature on HRM and worker cooperatives as it provides some insights that are rarely found in that literature. It also provides guidance to worker cooperatives about increasing the fit between employee ownership and HRM policies and outcomes.