Earnings management (EM) is manipulation done by management in preparing financial statement in order to gain management advantages or to increase the firm value. EM can reduce the quality of financial statements because it does not show the real earning periodical. This research aims to identify the effect of good corporate governance (GCG) (institutional ownership, managerial ownership, frequency of board meetings, frequency of audit committee (AC) meetings), firm size, and leverage on the EM. Population comprises the companies in LQ 45 index of Iindonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period 2010–2014. Samples of the research were taken using purposive sampling method, and the variables are tested using multiple linear regression analysis. The results of the research show that partially, only leverage has significant effect on EM, while institutional ownership, managerial ownership, frequency of board meeting, frequency of AC meetings, and firm size have no significant effect on EM, but all of the variables have simultaneously significant effect on EM. Limitations of the research are the only used 6 independent variables and 21 companies as samples of the research.

Indonesia has implemented the National Health Insurance (JKN) program since 2014. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) detected fraud in the program, which causes state losses. Prevention by the Social Security Administering Bodies (BPJS), law enforcers, and health care facility providers (faskes) has proven not optimal yet. This study aims to determine the effect of Information Technology Innovation and Organizational Culture on fraud prevention in the Regional General Hospitals (RSUD) in Sumatra with a total sample of 421 respondents. This study applies a quantitative approach and uses a questionnaire instrument in collecting research data. The results showed that Information Technology Innovation and Organizational Culture affected fraud prevention. The results of this study proved that in public sector organizations, the level of fraud could be prevented by Information Technology Innovation and Organizational Culture.

This study touches upon fraud prevention at the Regional Public Hospital (RSUD) in Sumatra Region in 2021. The authors used a quantitative approach to conduct the study. This research is based on a survey of 421 respondents, namely the personnel of the Medical Recording Department, the Internal Inspection Unit, the Medical Committee, the Coder, and the Accounting Department at RSUD. Sumatra was chosen to be the region under research because, according to data from the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), Sumatera Region has 6 provinces where most cases of fraud have been reported in government hospitals. The data analysis technique uses Structural Equation Modelling (LISREL). The results of the study show that: (1) information technology innovation has a positive and significant impact on public governance; (2) fraud prevention has a positive and significant impact on public governance; (3) information technology innovation has a positive and significant impact on public governance in terms of fraud prevention.

This study extends examining the effect of capital structure (Debt Equity Ratio) on firm performance (Tobin’s q dan ROA), quadratic (concave) effect of capital structure on firm performance, the effect of Multiple Large Shareholder Structure (MLSS) and institutional ownership on firm performance. This study differ from previous studies by pinpointing the category of debt to calculate Debt to Equity Ratio. The sample of this study is 424 observations from 53 non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange including Index Kompas 100 from 2013 to 2020. Using fixed effect panel regression, this research finds inconsistent evidence that capital structure has insignificant negative effect on firm performance and has not a quadratic (concave) effect on firm performance. This study finds MLSS have insignificant negative effect on firm performance. This result could be caused by ownership structure in Indonesia is concentrated and percentage of MLSS is small. MLSS can not monitor the largest shareholder. This study also finds institutional ownership has insignificant negative effect on firm performance. This result could be caused by percentage of institusional owneship is  small that can not monitoring manager behaviour in determining debt and dividen policy.