PurposeThe financial policies of the modern world corporations and their investment decisions are generally considered as interrelated because the agency problems, associated with the debt level and its maturity structure, give rise to incentives for overinvestment or underinvestment. The present study empirically investigates the linkage between debt maturity structure and firm investment in a financially constrained environment, using Pakistan as a case study, to determine how the institutional environment in which firms operate affect these decisions and their linkage.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is carried in a panel data setting using panel regression models as the baseline methods. Moreover, generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimators are used, coupled with the instrumental variables approach, for robustness and improving the efficiency and consistency of estimates.FindingsResults suggest that firms rely more on short financing in Pakistan. Thus, given the capital structure which is characterized by higher proportion of short-term financing, the higher level of leverage is less likely to cause underinvestment problem. However, the underinvestment problem do persists in the firms that have higher portion of long-term debt. These findings imply that the debt-overhang problem may persist even in the financially constrained environments where attractive investment opportunities are limited, and long-term financing is difficult to acquire.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by revealing how corporate investment and financing decisions and their linkage is influenced by the institutional environment of the less developed countries which is characterized by underdeveloped financial markets, inefficient legal system and weak investor protection system.
The present study empirically investigates the effect of corporate governance on the value of cash holding, usage of excess cash, and firm performance in concentrated and competitive industries in the context of less developed countries. The empirical analysis was conducted in the panel data setting using Pakistan as a case study. Our findings suggest a strong relationship between the value of cash holding and corporate governance, and the complementary effect of product market competition for corporate governance. This suggests that the external market discipline is also needed, in addition to good governance, to resolve agency problems in less developed countries. This is because less developed countries are usually characterized by lower competition, poor mechanisms for shareholder protection, and weak legal systems. Consequently, agency problems are greater in less developed countries compared to developed countries. Our findings also indicate that firms with good governance dissipate less excess cash on internal investment, dividends and diversification in competitive industries. Moreover, the significant positive relationship between the lagged excess cash and corporate governance dummy interaction with the dividend supports the dividend outcome model, particularly in the concentrated industries. Finally, our results suggest that the efficient utilization of excess cash, induced by good governance, leads to better corporate performance in less developed countries.
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