There have been three empirical studies examining the share price reaction following trades by directors of UK companies (King and Poell, 1988; Pope, Morris and Peel, 1990; and Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Pukiss, 1994). All three of these UK studies used different definitions of 'buy' and 'sell' signals resulting from the transactions of directors and employ different controls to detect the presence of any 'size effects'. We investigate whether the signal definition explains the different conclusions drawn by these earlier studies, and examine whether or not any observed abnormal returns are explicable by the small companies effect. We also investigate trading strategies based on holding a long portfolio of shares purchased or a short portfolio of shares sold by directors held until the end of the study period or until a 'reserving event' (e.g. a sale following a purchase by director[s] is observed). Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997.

No abstract

We document that the observed persistence amongst the worst performing actively managed mutual funds is attributable to funds that have performed poorly both in the current and prior year. We demonstrate that this persistence results from an unwillingness of investors in these funds to respond to bad performance by withdrawing their capital. In contrast, funds that only performed poorly in the current year have a significantly larger (out)flow of funds/return sensitivity and consequently show no evidence of persistence in their returns.

No abstract

Attitudes towards male and female managers within organizations are well documented, but how the stock market perceives their relative capabilities is less studied. Recent evidence documents a negative short‐run market reaction to the appointment of female chief executive officers and suggests that female executives are less informed than their male counterparts about future corporate performance. These results appear to dispute the stock market value of having women on corporate boards. However, such short‐run market reactions may retain a ‘gender bias’, reflecting the prevalence of negative stereotypes, where the market reacts to ‘beliefs’ rather than ‘performance’. This study tests for such bias by examining the stock market reaction to directors' trades in their own companies' shares, by measuring both the short‐run and longer‐term returns after the directors' trades. Allowing for firm and trade effects, some evidence is found that, in the longer term, markets recognize that female executives' trades are informative about future corporate performance, although initially markets underestimate these effects. This has important implications for research that has attempted to assess the value of board diversity by examining only short‐run stock market responses.