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The Research and Development Center for Communication Security (CEPESC) has a long partnership history with the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court to improve the security of the Brazilian election system. Among all the contributions from CEPESC, probably the most important is a cryptographic library used in some critical moments during the election. In an effort to improve transparency and auditability of the solution, we present the new cryptographic library developed at CEPESC, named libharpia. Its main design goal is to allow transparency and readability while substantially increasing security. One of the main advances is the use of post-quantum cryptography, implemented through secure hybrid protocols that mix current cryptographic standards (specifically elliptic curves) with new cryptographic primitives based on Lattices, believed to be secure against quantum computers.

The stream cipher ChaCha has received a lot of attention and recently is being used as a new cipher suite in TLS 1.3, as a random number generator for operating systems (Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, and DragonFly BSD), a proposed standardization in RFC 7634 for use IKE and IPsec, and by the WireGuard VPN protocol. Because of that, it is very important to understand and study the security of this algorithm. Previous works showed that it is possible to break up to 7 of the 20 rounds of ChaCha. In this paper, we show that a simple modification in the algorithm, namely changing the rotation distances in the Quarter Round Function, makes ChaCha more secure against all the most effective known attacks without any loss in performance. In fact, we show that with these changes, it is only possible to break up to 6 rounds of ChaCha. Therefore, it would be no longer possible to break 7 rounds of ChaCha with the best-known attacks.