Empathy for pain activates brain areas partially overlapping with those underpinning the first-hand experience of pain. It remains unclear, however, whether such shared activations imply that pain empathy engages similar neural functions as first-hand pain experiences. To overcome the limitations of previous neuroimaging research, we pursued a conceptually novel approach: we used the phenomenon of placebo analgesia to experimentally reduce the first-hand experience of pain, and assessed whether this results in a concomitant reduction of empathy for pain. We first carried out a functional MRI experiment (n = 102) that yielded results in the expected direction: participants experiencing placebo analgesia also reported decreased empathy for pain, and this was associated with reduced engagement of anterior insular and midcingulate cortex: that is, areas previously associated with shared activations in pain and empathy for pain. In a second step, we used a psychopharmacological manipulation (n = 50) to determine whether these effects can be blocked via an opioid antagonist. The administration of the opioid antagonist naltrexone blocked placebo analgesia and also resulted in a corresponding "normalization" of empathy for pain. Taken together, these findings suggest that pain empathy may be associated with neural responses and neurotransmitter activity engaged during first-hand pain, and thus might indeed be grounded in our own pain experiences.T here is widespread consensus that empathy recruits brain structures that are also involved in the first-hand experience of the emotion for which one is showing empathy. For example, in the domain of pain, recent image-based and coordinate-based meta-analyses of functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown that sharing the pain of others consistently activates the bilateral anterior insular (AI) and anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) (1). The AI and aMCC are key areas of the network of areas activated by pain, and their activity has been directly related to the affective-motivational component of pain (2). The observation of such shared neural activations has therefore motivated simulationist models, such as the shared representations account of empathy (see refs. 3-5 for review), which propose that we come to understand the feelings of others by engaging the same mental representations as when directly experiencing the emotion with which we are empathizing.However, neuroimaging alone cannot provide sufficient empirical support for such claims because fMRI activation of the same brain area does not necessarily imply equivalence of mental representations and neural functions (see ref. 6 for review). Areas such as the aMCC and AI, for example, are not only activated by pain, but also by phenomena as distinct as cognitive control and responding to salient events in general (see refs. 7-9 for review). This ambiguity is a result of inherent methodological limitations. First, fMRI has mostly been used as a correlational method that identifies neural responses co-occurring with certain c...
Previous research in social neuroscience has consistently shown that empathy for pain recruits brain areas that are also activated during the first-hand experience of pain. This has been interpreted as evidence that empathy relies upon neural processes similar to those underpinning the first-hand experience of emotions. However, whether such overlapping neural activations imply that equivalent neural functions are engaged by empathy and direct emotion experiences remains to be demonstrated. We induced placebo analgesia, a phenomenon specifically modulating the first-hand experience of pain, to test whether this also reduces empathy for pain. Subjective and neural measures of pain and empathy for pain were collected using self-report and event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants underwent painful electrical stimulation or witnessed that another person was undergoing such stimulation. Self-report showed decreased empathy during placebo analgesia, and this was mirrored by reduced amplitudes of the pain-related P2, an ERP component indexing neural computations related to the affective-motivational component of pain. Moreover, these effects were specific for pain, as self-report and ERP measures of control conditions unrelated to pain were not affected by placebo analgesia. Together, the present results suggest that empathy seems to rely on neural processes that are (partially) functionally equivalent to those engaged by first-hand emotion experiences. Moreover, they imply that analgesics may have the unwanted side effect of reducing empathic resonance and concern for others.
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