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Purpose In mobile platforms, an increasing number of third-party developers (developers) create new ideas and enhance their expertise through knowledge sharing on the developers’ community. Notwithstanding the importance of the sharing and its uniqueness on the mobile platform contexts, the motivational factors of sharing their knowledge on the community have been underinvestigated. Therefore, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive framework to enhance the knowledge sharing in the mobile platform context. Design/methodology/approach Based on the theory of reasoned action, this paper incorporated intrinsic and internalized extrinsic motivations with two unique features of platform environments: platform open policies and coopetitive relationships. To test, an online survey was distributed to four developer communities in Korea, two Android and two iOS communities. Findings The results show that a platform pursuing higher openness causes the developers to find higher social pressure for information sharing. The coopetitive relationship with other developers in the same platform takes dissimilar roles; reciprocity significantly increases subjective norm, while rivalry does attitude. Self-efficacy and self-development stimulate knowledge sharing. Furthermore, multilevel analysis to capture the difference between two leading mobile platforms indicates no path difference but, interestingly, shows significant mean difference between the two platforms regarding perceived openness and rivalry. Originality/value With this paper, the authors fulfill the need to understand the knowledge-sharing intention of developers in the context of mobile platforms where developers can be potential competitors or cooperators and where two platforms offer different policies and developmental environments.

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This study explores how bribery affects firm growth by focusing on the asymmetric dependence of firms on government resources and services. We conceptualize bribery as relationships through which bribery requests require firms to frequently interact with rent-seeking government officials. Through bribery relationships, such officials extort firms beyond the exchange of bribe money for preferential treatment, depriving acquiescing firms of time and effort and thereby imposing hidden costs that could be otherwise used for firm growth. We find that bribery relationships damage firm growth. Firm status such as introducing new products or not affects how rent-seeking government officials check on firms and calculate their extortion schemes in bribery relationships; bribery relationships damage firm growth more significantly for firms without new products. The damage of bribery relationships to firm growth is also contingent on institutional environments. Under pervasive corruption, firms in bribery relationships may increase their acquiescence to the extortion of rent-seeking government officials. In countries with high-quality governance, however, firms can depend on sound regulations and rules of law and government officials experience high moral costs of corruption. Thus, the negative effect of the bribery relationship on firm growth will be strengthened under pervasive corruption and weakened under high-quality governance. Using Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey and World Governance Indicators data for 28 Eastern European countries from 2002–2014, we demonstrate the multifaceted features of the bribery relationship and its interaction with country-level institutional environments.