Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.

Humans are social animals, but not everyone will be mindful of others to the same extent. Individual differences have been found, but would social mindfulness also be shaped by one’s location in the world? Expecting cross-national differences to exist, we examined if and how social mindfulness differs across countries. At little to no material cost, social mindfulness typically entails small acts of attention or kindness. Even though fairly common, such low-cost cooperation has received little empirical attention. Measuring social mindfulness across 31 samples from industrialized countries and regions (n = 8,354), we found considerable variation. Among selected country-level variables, greater social mindfulness was most strongly associated with countries’ better general performance on environmental protection. Together, our findings contribute to the literature on prosociality by targeting the kind of everyday cooperation that is more focused on communicating benevolence than on providing material benefits.

Five experiments investigated the war contagion phenomenon in the context of international relations, hypothesizing that reminders of past inter- (but not intra-) state war will increase support for future, unrelated interstate violence. After being reminded of the Korean War as an interstate rather than intrastate conflict, South Koreans showed stronger support for violent responses to new, unrelated interstate tensions (Study 1). Replicating this war contagion effect among Americans, we demonstrated that it was mediated by heightened perceived threat from, and negative images of, a fictitious country unrelated to the past war (Study 2), and moderated by national glorification (Study 3). Study 4, using another international conflict in the U.S. history, provided further conceptual replication. Finally, Study 5 included a baseline in addition to the inter- versus intrastate manipulation, yielding further support for the generalized effect of past interstate war reminders on preferences for aggressive approaches to new interstate tensions.

Using a real-life case of intergroup victimization (i.e., victimization of migrant workers in Korea), we tested our hypothesis that positive attitudes toward compensating a victimized outgroup and intention to participate in ingroup corrective actions would be facilitated when a prosocial orientation is combined with high levels of perceived self-uniqueness. In Study 1, we measured participants’ social value orientation and their self-attributed need for uniqueness as our independent variables ( N = 249) and found a predicted interaction effect, such that prosocials with high levels of perceived self-uniqueness were more likely to support outgroup compensation and more willing to engage in ingroup corrective actions than were prosocials with low levels of self-uniqueness. In contrast, for proselfs neither compensation nor intention to participate in ingroup correction varied as a function of self-uniqueness. We replicated these findings in Study 2 ( N = 106), in which we measured participants’ trait agreeableness as an index of prosocial orientation and manipulated self-uniqueness via priming. Implications of our findings for research on outgroup reparation and future directions are discussed.

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We examine how individual differences in self-focused and other-focused orientations are associated with prosocial and antisocial behaviors/attitudes using data from Wave III of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (N = 1,319), Waves 5 (N = 83,975) and 6 (N = 90,350) of the World Values Survey, and an online American sample (N = 572). Across our studies, we find evidence that other-focused orientations are positively associated with prosocial outcomes, and negatively associated with antisocial outcomes. These effects are highly consistent cross-nationally and when using different operationalizations of the constructs. Self-focused orientations positively relate to antisocial outcomes, and this association is consistent cross-nationally, but varies depending on how variables are operationalized. The association between self-focused orientations and prosocial behaviors tends towards a small positive effect; however, this effect is heterogeneous both cross-nationally and across ways of operationalizing the variables. Overall, the effects of other-focused orientations are consistently larger than the effects of self-focused orientations. We also note consistent moderate-to-large positive correlations between measures of self-focused and other-focused orientations, but highly variable small-to-moderate (positive and negative) correlations between various prosocial and antisocial behaviors/attitudes. We conclude that interventions designed to alter rates of prosocial or antisocial behaviors should evaluate effects on both types of behaviors to monitor unintended impacts. Our studies caution that interventions targeting self-focused orientations may be risky of unintended consequences, whereas other-focused orientations may be more optimal intervention targets.

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U.S.-based research suggests conservatism is linked with less concern about contracting coronavirus and less preventative behaviors to avoid infection. Here, we investigate whether these tendencies are partly attributable to distrust in scientific information, and evaluate whether they generalize outside the U.S., using public data and recruited representative samples across four studies (Ntotal=37,790). In Studies 1–3, we examine these relationships in the U.S., yielding converging evidence for a sequential indirect effect of conservatism on compliance through scientific (dis)trust and infection concern. In Study 4, we compare these relationships across 19 distinct countries, finding that they are strongest in North America, extend to support for lockdown restrictions, and that the indirect effects do not fully appear in any other country in our sample other than Indonesia. These effects suggest that rather than a general distrust in science, whether or not conservatism predicts coronavirus outcomes depends upon national contexts.