Whether the mode of birth delivery correlates with the incidence of postpartum depression (PPD) is still under debate. This study seeks to clarify such a correlation and to further investigate if there are any differences in the likelihood of PPD medical care use among women with and without a history of depression. A logistic regression at two assessment points (6-month and 12-month postpartum) on the National Health Insurance Database in Taiwan is performed. In total, 32,729 women were included who gave first birth from 2007 to 2011 via cesarean section (CS), elective CS, and vaginal delivery, of whom 3580 (10.9%) were diagnosed with a history of depression. Findings show that CS was associated with a higher likelihood of PPD doctor visits regardless of whether the women have a history of depression or not, but elective CS tended to have different impacts for these two groups of women. Mentally healthy women who experienced elective CS had 1.36- and 1.64-times higher risk of PDD medical care use than those who delivered vaginally, whereas previous depressive women undertaking an elective cesarean birth had no significant difference observed in incidences. A notably higher risk of elective CS delivery versus vaginal delivery for mentally healthy women suggests that elective CS is not clinically appropriate, yet it might be an alternative to vaginal delivery with careful counseling for pregnant women who experience a history of depression.
This paper proposes the majority-voting punishment mechanism and compares its effect on the contribution decision with other punishment mechanisms when individuals have homogeneous or heterogeneous marginal per capita returns on public goods. The experimental results show that if individuals are homogeneous, the majority-voting punishment mechanism is an alternative to encourage cooperation and reduce antisocial punishment. But, if individuals are heterogeneous, the individual and majority-voting punishment mechanisms are similarly effective in promoting cooperation in the organization. Furthermore, whatever punishment mechanism is implemented, organizations should pay attention to the problem of antisocial punishment.
This paper considers a discrete public good subscription game under threshold uncertainty and private information on valuations and analyzes the effect of change in cost uncertainty on the private contribution equilibrium under a simultaneous institution. Comparative statics with respect to the changes in the cost distribution are derived. We find that if the cost distribution becomes more dispersed, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread, the expected total contributions to the public good will decrease. Our proposition provides a policy implication that if the suppliers are able to reduce the uncertainty of the cost distribution, the private contribution to the public good will increase.
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