Liquid democracy is a collective decision making paradigm which lies between direct and representative democracy. One of its main features is that voters can delegate their votes in a transitive manner such that: A delegates to B and B delegates to C leads to A indirectly delegates to C. These delegations can be effectively empowered by implementing liquid democracy in a social network, so that voters can delegate their votes to any of their neighbors in the network. However, it is uncertain that such a delegation process will lead to a stable state where all voters are satisfied with the people representing them. We study the stability (w.r.t. voters preferences) of the delegation process in liquid democracy and model it as a game in which the players are the voters and the strategies are their possible delegations. We answer several questions on the equilibria of this process in any social network or in social networks that correspond to restricted types of graphs.We show that a Nash-equilibrium may not exist, and that it is even NP-complete to decide whether one exists or not. This holds even if the social network is a complete graph or a bounded degree graph. We further show that this existence problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. the treewidth of the social network. Besides these hardness results, we demonstrate that an equilibrium always exists whatever the preferences of the voters iff the social network is a tree. We design a dynamic programming procedure to determine some desirable equilibria (e.g., minimizing the dissatisfaction of the voters) in polynomial time for tree social networks. Lastly, we study the convergence of delegation dynamics. Unfortunately, when an equilibrium exists, we show that a best response dynamics may not converge, even if the social network is a path or a complete graph.Aim of this paper. In this work, we tackle the problem of the stability of the delegation process in the LD setting. Indeed, it is likely that the preferences of voters over possible gurus will be motivated by different criteria and possibly contrary opinions. Hence, the iterative process where each voter chooses her delegate may end up in an unstable situation, i.e., a situation in which some voters would change their delegations. A striking example to illustrate this point is to consider an election where the voters could be positioned on the real line in a way that represents their right-wing left-wing political identity. If voters are ideologically close enough, each voter, starting from the left-side, could agree to delegate to her closest neighbor on her right. By transitivity, this would lead to all voters, including the extreme-left voters, having an extreme-right voter for guru. These unstable situations raise the questions: "Under what conditions do the iterative delegations of the voters always reach an equilibrium? Does such an equilibrium even exist? Can we determine equilibria that are more desirable than others?".We assume that voters are part of an SN represented by an undirected graph so that they can o...
The personalization of our news consumption on social media has a tendency to reinforce our pre-existing beliefs instead of balancing our opinions. To tackle this issue, Garimella et al. (NIPS'17) modeled the spread of these viewpoints, also called campaigns, using the independent cascade model introduced by Kempe, Kleinberg and Tardos (KDD'03) and studied an optimization problem that aims to balance information exposure when two opposing campaigns propagate in a network. This paper investigates a natural generalization of this optimization problem in which μ different campaigns propagate in the network and we aim to maximize the expected number of nodes that are reached by at least ν or none of the campaigns, where μ ≥ ν ≥ 2. Following Garimella et al., despite this general setting, we also investigate a simplified one, in which campaigns propagate in a correlated manner. While for the simplified setting, we show that the problem can be approximated within a constant factor for any constant μ and ν, for the general setting, we give reductions leading to several approximation hardness results when ν ≥ 3. For instance, assuming the gap exponential time hypothesis to hold, we obtain that the problem cannot be approximated within a factor of n−g(n) for any g(n) = o(1) where n is the number of nodes in the network. We complement our hardness results with an Ω(n−1/2)-approximation algorithm for the general setting when ν = 3 and μ is arbitrary.
Liquid democracy is a voting paradigm that allows voters that are part of a social network to either vote directly or delegate their voting rights to one of their neighbors. The delegations are transitive in the sense, that a voter who decides to delegate, delegates both her own vote and the ones she has received through delegations. The additional exibility of the paradigm allows to transfer voting power towards a subset of voters ideally containing the most expert voters on the question at hand. It is thus tempting to assume that liquid democracy can lead to more accurate decisions. This claim has been investigated recently, maybe most importantly, by Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procaccia [30] and Caragiannis and Micha [10], who provide however mostly negative results using a model similar to the uncertain dichotomous choice model.In this paper, we provide new insights on this question. In particular, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been formulated by Caragiannis and Micha [10]. Here, we are in a setting with two election alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct. In ODP, the goal is to organise the delegations in the social network in order to maximize the probability that the correct alternative, referred to as ground truth, is elected. While the problem is known to be computationally hard, we strengthen existing hardness results by providing a novel strong approximation hardness result: For any positive constant 𝐶, we prove that, unless 𝑃 = 𝑁 𝑃, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for ODP that achieves an approximation guarantee of 𝛼 ≥ (ln 𝑛) −𝐶 , where 𝑛 is the number of voters. The reduction designed for this result uses poorly connected social networks in which some voters su er from misinformation. Interestingly, under some hypothesis on either the accuracies of voters or the connectivity of the network, we obtain a polynomial-time 1/2-approximation algorithm. This observation proves formally that the connectivity of the social network is a key feature for the e ciency of the liquid democracy paradigm. Lastly, we run extensive simulations and observe that simple algorithms (working either in a centralized or decentralized way) outperform direct democracy on a large class of instances. Overall, our contributions yield new insights on the question in which situations liquid democracy can be bene cial.
The influence maximization paradigm has been used by researchers in various fields in order to study how information spreads in social networks. While previously the attention was mostly on efficiency, more recently fairness issues have been taken into account in this scope. In the present paper, we propose to use randomization as a mean for achieving fairness. While this general idea is not new, it has not been applied in this area. Similar to previous works like Fish et al. (WWW ’19) and Tsang et al. (IJCAI ’19), we study the maximin criterion for (group) fairness. In contrast to their work however, we model the problem in such a way that, when choosing the seed sets, probabilistic strategies are possible rather than only deterministic ones. We introduce two different variants of this probabilistic problem, one that entails probabilistic strategies over nodes (node-based problem) and a second one that entails probabilistic strategies over sets of nodes (set-based problem). After analyzing the relation between the two probabilistic problems, we show that, while the original deterministic maximin problem was inapproximable, both probabilistic variants permit approximation algorithms that achieve a constant multiplicative factor of 1 − 1/e minus an additive arbitrarily small error that is due to the simulation of the information spread. For the node-based problem, the approximation is achieved by observing that a polynomial-sized linear program approximates the problem well. For the set-based problem, we show that a multiplicative-weight routine can yield the approximation result. For an experimental study, we provide implementations of multiplicative-weight routines for both the set-based and the node-based problems and compare the achieved fairness values to existing methods. Maybe non-surprisingly, we show that the ex-ante values, i.e., minimum expected value of an individual (or group) to obtain the information, of the computed probabilistic strategies are significantly larger than the (ex-post) fairness values of previous methods. This indicates that studying fairness via randomization is a worthwhile path to follow. Interestingly and maybe more surprisingly, we observe that even the ex-post fairness values, i.e., fairness values of sets sampled according to the probabilistic strategies computed by our routines, dominate over the fairness achieved by previous methods on many of the instances tested.
In this paper, we provide a generic anytime lower bounding procedure for minmax regret optimization problems. We show that the lower bound obtained is always at least as accurate as the lower bound recently proposed by Chassein and Goerigk [3]. This lower bound can be viewed as the optimal value of a linear programming relaxation of a mixed integer programming formulation of minmax regret optimization, but the contribution of the paper is to compute this lower bound via a double oracle algorithm [10] that we specify. The double oracle algorithm is designed by relying on a game theoretic view of robust optimization, similar to the one developed by Mastin et al.[9], and it can be efficiently implemented for any minmax regret optimization problem whose standard version is "easy". We describe how to efficiently embed this lower bound in a branch and bound procedure. Finally we apply our approach to the robust shortest path problem. Our numerical results show a significant gain in the computation times compared to previous approaches in the literature.
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