Despite considerable interest in the means by which policy learning occurs, and in how it is that the framework of policy may be subject to radical change, the “black box” of economic policy making remains surprisingly murky. This article utilizes Peter Hall's concept of “social learning” to develop a more sophisticated model of policy learning; one in which paradigm failure does not necessarily lead to wholesale paradigm replacement, and in which an administrative battle of ideas may be just as important a determinant of paradigm change as a political struggle. It then applies this model in a survey of U.K. economic policy making since the 1930s: examining the shift to “Keynesianism” during the 1930s and 1940s; the substantial revision of this framework in the 1960s; the collapse of the “Keynesian‐plus” framework in the 1970s; and the major revisions to the new “neoliberal” policy framework in the 1980s and 1990s.

Policy networks are advanced as an alternative to the Westminster model of the UK polity but the theory lacks an internal dynamic and has typological problems. This article applies Peter Hall's (1993) concept of 'social learning' to policy networks and maps the networks found in two case studies of British economic policy making: Hall's own study of the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the 1970s and the author's research on the advent of 'Keynesian-plus' in the early 1960s. The article advances three main propositions. Firstly, that integrating the concept of social learning can dynamize the policy network model. Secondly, the case studies suggest that different network configurations are associated with different orders of policy change but that Hall's definition of 'third order change' may be too restrictive. Thirdly, policy networks can be much more complex and fluid then is generally claimed, sometimes becoming so extensive that they might be termed a 'meta-network'.

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Parliamentary Affairs following peer review. The version of record [published in vol. 66 no. 4 (2013), pp. 708-731] is available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss012. That version was first published online 'early view' in June 2012 Please check against final version of record before quotation.We were brothers all In honour, as in one community (William Wordsworth, The Prelude)

In 1957, the Labour Party published radical proposals for a state earnings-related pension scheme ('national superannuation') whose funds were to be invested in stock markets to generate high returns, and to help modernize and dynamize the British economy. This article explores a sophisticated campaign against the proposal by the insurance industry, and the resistance of the unions. In doing so, it considers the implications of this cross-class alliance, not least in terms of a possible missed opportunity to build a 'developmental state' in the UK, but also in terms of the country's increasingly inadequate and inequitable system of pension provision.The failure of 'nationalization by attraction'

Most studies of the 'friends and neighbours' effect in voting behaviour have accounted for their observed patterns using Key's classic identification of this effect as reflecting localism and voting for the 'home town boy'. This paper introduces other potential local influences, and hypothesises that there should be separate local friends', neighbours', and political friends' effects. This expanded model is successfully tested using data from elections for the leadership of the UK's Labour Party in 1994 and 2010. All three effects operated, to a greater or lesser extent, in the pattern of voting for most of the candidates.