Purpose Grounded in agency and clan theories, this study aims to examine how, when and why joint liability works as a control mechanism to reduce opportunism among tea supplier groups in China. Design/methodology/approach Survey data from 82 supplier groups (three respondents per group) were collected. Findings Joint liability is related positively to peer monitoring (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated positively by group leaders’ perceived legitimate authority and negatively by reciprocity and shared norms. Social implications Opportunism is operationalized as the use of illegal pesticides, the violation of manufacturer–supplier contractual agreements and joint liability, as suppliers’ liability of having the whole group’s seasonal production is rejected by the manufacturer if a single act of opportunism is detected in the group. Originality/value Our study demonstrates how and under what conditions the joint-liability mechanism is linked with the reduction of multi-suppliers’ opportunism. We pave the way for future applications of the control mechanism to fields related to inter-organizational governance. Most importantly, we apply Ouchi’s clan theory (1979, 1980) to conceptualize manufacturer–supplier and supplier–supplier relationships in China and provide first-hand evidence to validate its applicability and generalizability to the context. The study also offers insights on network influences in inter-organizational relationships (Gu et al., 2010; Wathne and Heide, 2004) and confirms the important roles of network factors in inter-organizational relationships. In particular, peer monitoring operates as a mediator and normative factors operate as facilitators (moderators) for the joint liability to work as a mechanism to control opportunism in this relationship context.

PurposeThis study aims to examine how implicit distance (cognitive and social) impacts supply chain capabilities, and the roles of information technology (IT) utilization and supply chain flexibility in this process.Design/methodology/approachThe authors designed a conceptual model including the implicit distance, supply chain flexibility, supply chain capability and IT utilization and verified the relationships among variables through a survey that collected data from 104 manufacturing enterprises in China.FindingsThe results show that cognitive and social distances positively and negatively affect supply chain flexibility, respectively. Furthermore, IT utilization strengthens the positive effect of cognitive distance and the negative effect of social distance on supply chain flexibility. Additionally, supply chain flexibility has a positive effect on supply chain capability and mediates the effects of cognitive and social distances on supply chain capability.Practical implicationsEnterprises should prioritize cooperation with different types of partners with whom the enterprises have established good collaborative working experiences. Moreover, if enterprises cooperate with new partners, enterprises should communicate and handle things face to face instead of frequently utilizing IT.Originality/valueThis study links the implicit distance between enterprises with supply chain capability and newly applies social network theory to explain the mechanism. Further, the authors' data confirm the moderating role of IT utilization in this process, supplementing the research on implicit distance. Moreover, this study employs dynamic capability theory to better understand how firms can improve supply chain capabilities.

PurposeWhat are the performance implications of peer monitoring in a multiple-supplier context? Grounded in agency and social exchange theories, this study aims to examine how, when, and why peer monitoring works as a crucial control mechanism to reduce opportunism among suppliers.Design/methodology/approachA conceptual model and research hypotheses are tested using survey data from 246 respondents in 82 supplier groups.FindingsResults suggest that peer monitoring is related positively to perceived deterrence (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated negatively by generalized reciprocity and positively by balanced reciprocity and negative reciprocity.Originality/valueThis study introduces the application of peer monitoring into business-to-business research and shows how it reduces opportunism. Its findings have implications for manufacturers on how to use peer monitoring to control opportunism among multiple suppliers.

Game strategies are widely used by companies to attract users and increase their stickiness. At the same time, the protection of the ecological environment is also an important expression of corporate social responsibility. This paper explores the integration of social responsibility with gaming strategies from the psychological perspective of game withdrawal, and explores the incorporation of social responsibility as an element in gamification design to reduce user withdrawal behaviour, thereby increasing individual’s environmentally sustainable behaviour. We evidenced our hypothesis through two studies. Study one proved our hypothesis by recruiting 106 university undergraduates (from Wuhan University, mean age 20, of whom 47 were female and 59 were male) to prove our hypothesis by recalling previous experiences with different types of games. Study two further tested our hypothesis by manipulating participants’ guilt through randomly recruiting 196 participants (mean age 35, of whom 88 were female and 108 were male, 35 of them were students, 107 were office workers and 54 were from other sectors) from different industries through the questionnaire research website Credamo. The findings show that incorporating social responsibility elements into the design of games can make users engage in pro-social behaviour while playing the game, and the guilt that users feel because of the game will be compensated by pro-social behaviour, thus reducing the game frequency and duration and improving the intent of pro-social behaviour. At the same time, players’ self-control moderates the effect of guilt on game play volume under a socially responsible gamification design.