G21, G34, G38, M41, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility (CSR), earnings management, earnings opacity, investor protection,

corporate social responsibility (CSR), Dow Jones Sustainability Index, institutional theory, investor protection, legal enforcement,

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This paper studies the impacts of corporate governance on earnings management. We use firm-level governance data, taken from Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asian countries, in addition to the country-level governance data used in past studies. Our conclusion is as follows. First, firms with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management. Second, there is a size effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there is a turning point for leverage effect, i.e. when the governance index is large, leverage effect exists, otherwise reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be scrutinised closely and thus finds it harder to fool the market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, firms with higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms in stronger anti-director rights countries tend to exhibit stronger earnings smoothing. This counter-intuitive result is different from Leuz et al. (2003).

This study explores the phenomena associated with conflicts of interest, particularly as they pertain to the brokerage and proprietary trading divisions of investment banks. This distinguishes it from past studies, which have researched conflicts of interest between underwriting and brokerage divisions. We examine whether or not an investment bank issues buy recommendations to the market and buys (sells) the same recommended stocks through its proprietary trading division before (after) recommendations, and if so, to what extent this goes on. We find that these conflicts of interest do exist and that these investment banks can profit from their recommendations in the short run.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the media coverage of corporate social performance (CSP), as well as the ultimate impact that such coverage has on the financial performance of corporate entities. Design/methodology/approach – Based on a sample of financial holding companies (FHC) listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the authors select the two most popular newspapers in Taiwan, to construct the unique media coverage of CSP activity database. Findings – First, the quantity of news articles about social activities of FHCs is positively correlated with financial performance. Second, the authors find that news articles about FHCs’ positive social activities for shareholders will trigger a positive evaluation by shareholders; however, news articles about FHCs’ positive (negative) social activities for employees will trigger a negative (positive) evaluation by shareholders. But if the news articles about FHCs’ positive social activities for employees are initiated by the media, rather than by the company itself, they will trigger a positive evaluation by shareholders. Originality/value – The average shareholders may praise management for one particular CSP activity of a positive nature, whereas they may criticize another CSP activity, despite it being generally regarded outside of the firm as also being positive in nature. It therefore becomes clear that when setting out to investigate whether “doing good” actually does translate into “doing well,” the authors should not attempt to total different kinds of information on CSP; In this paper, the authors emphasize that they need to be analyzed separately.

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