This systematic review covers the extant literature on corporate governance in entrepreneurial firms. Using a sample of 137 research papers published from pre-1990 through June 2018 in 60 journals, we categorize outlets, research methods (quantitative, qualitative, review, and non-empirical), theoretical perspectives, and research questions, highlighting key patterns. We then summarize the concepts under study in the sample literature, and the geographical sources and model specification of quantitative empirical studies. The conclusion highlights the quite fragmented nature of the field and the substantial knowledge gaps, and then proposes an actionable agenda for future research in terms of theories, research questions, research settings, and research designs. In particular, we describe the need to explore how corporate governance mechanisms interact with one another and affect firm outcomes, by applying novel theoretical perspectives and methods that could provide a better understanding of entrepreneurial firms' functioning. Keywords Corporate governance. Entrepreneurial firms. Literature review. New venture boards. Research agenda JEL classification G30. L26. M10 1 Introduction The last two decades witness a marked interest in research on corporate governance of entrepreneurial firms. While board of directors (BOD) is the most explored corporate governance mechanism in these studies, researchers also examine CEO characteristics and compensation, CEO-BOD relations, top management team characteristics and functioning, and ownership-related aspects. The limited set of reviews (e.g.

Purpose The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement. Design/methodology/approach In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management. Findings The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team. Originality/value As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

Purpose This paper aims to explore the relationship between the components of the management control system (MCS) based on the reform process of the management system of China Resources Group and the influence of these components on the implementation effect of MCS. Design/methodology/approach This study uses an exploratory research method and an open-ended grounded theory approach to conduct six formal investigations and several in-depth interviews with employees and senior management in China Resources Group. This paper supplements these data by performing a documentary analysis of the internal documents of China Resources Group such as the statistical yearbook, business plan and meeting records. Findings This study puts forward four propositions. The formal strategic planning process creates an application environment for the strategy map and balanced scorecard (BSC), making it easier for an enterprise to adopt these tools. The combination of the strategy map and formal strategic planning helps to build the logical relationship between strategic goals and budget goals and strengthens the correlation between budget and strategy. In diversified organizations applying MCS, the strategy map and BSC facilitate the implementation of the strategy for specialized business units, while the financial measure system facilitates the implementation of the strategy for diversified business units. Strategic boundaries based on financial measures in the MCS help organizations determine the scope of strategic choices before implementing strategies. Research limitations/implications Because of the chosen research approach, the research results may lack generalizability and the influence of the strategic planning process on budget participation, budget slack and other budget behaviors has not been fully discussed. Therefore, future studies are expected to provide more evidence regarding strategic planning and budget behaviors. Practical implications Before establishing a strategy map and BSC, the enterprise should consider the application environment to ensure their feasibility and legitimacy and construct the BSC system under appropriate conditions. A formal strategic planning process should be formed within the enterprise; that is, a set of detailed management methods should be adopted and clear rules should be used to support the enterprise management control process. The enterprise should add strategic boundaries to the MCS to determine the scope of strategic choices and the budgeting bottom line. Originality/value This paper sheds light on the impact of the formal strategic planning process on the organization and contributes new evidence on the key success factors for implementing the strategy map and BSC, enriching the researchers’ understanding of the applicability of the BSC.

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