Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are generally set up for gathering records from insecure environment. Nearly all security protocols for WSN believe that the opponent can achieve entirely control over a sensor node by way of direct physical access. The appearance of sensor networks as one of the main technology in the future has posed various challenges to researchers. Wireless sensor networks are composed of large number of tiny sensor nodes, running separately, and in various cases, with none access to renewable energy resources. In addition, security being fundamental to the acceptance and employ of sensor networks for numerous applications; also different set of challenges in sensor networks are existed. In this paper we will focus on security of Wireless Sensor Network.

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As wireless technologies have been improving in recent years, a mobility management mechanism is required to provide seamless and ubiquitous mobility for end users who are roaming among points of attachment in wireless networks. Thus, Mobile IPv6 was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to support the mobility service. However, Mobile IPv6 is unable to fulfill the requirements of real-time applications, such as video streaming service and voice over IP service, due to its high handover (HO) latency. To address this problem, Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) has been introduced by the IETF. In PMIPv6, which is a network-based approach, the serving network controls mobility management on behalf of the mobile node (MN). Thus, the MN is not required to participate in any mobility-related signaling. However, the PMIPv6 still suffers from lengthy HO latency and packet loss during a HO. This paper explores an elaborated survey on the HO procedure of PMIPv6 protocols and proposed approaches accompanied by a discussion about their points of weakness. Index Terms-Fast localized Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) handover (HO) procedure, HO in PMIPv6, PMIPv6, PMIPv6 with partial bicasting, predictive mode, reactive mode.

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In the Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol, a mobile node (MN) is a mobile device with a permanent home address (HoA) on its home link. The MN will acquire a care-of address (CoA) when it roams into a foreign link. It then sends a binding update (BU) message to the home agent (HA) and the correspondent node (CN) to inform them of its current CoA so that future data packets destined for its HoA will be forwarded to the CoA. The BU message, however, is vulnerable to different types of security attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle attack, the session hijacking attack, and the denial-of-service attack. The current security protocols in MIPv6 are not able to effectively protect the BU message against these attacks. The private-key-based BU (PKBU) protocol is proposed in this research to overcome the shortcomings of some existing MIPv6 protocols. PKBU incorporates a method to assert the address ownership of the MN, thus allowing the CN to validate that the MN is not a malicious node. The results obtained show that it addresses the security requirements while being able to check the address ownership of the MN. PKBU also incorporates a method to verify the reachability of the MN.

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