PurposeThe study focusses on explaining why advocates for reform to state audit in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1980s, focussed on improving the links between the new National Audit Office (NAO) and Parliament, rather than on traditional notions of audit independence. The study shows how this focus on the auditor's link to Parliament depends on a particular concept of liberty and relates this to the wider literature on the place of audit in democratic society.Design/methodology/approachUnderstanding the issue of independence of audit in protecting the liberties and rights of citizens needs addressed. In this article, the authors investigate the creation of audit independence in the UK in the National Audit Act (1983). To do so, the authors employ a neo-Roman concept of liberty to historical archives ranging from the late 1960s to 1983.FindingsThe study shows that advocates for audit reform in the UK from the 1960s to the 1980s were arguing for an extension to Parliament's power to hold the executive to account and that their focus was influential on the way that the new NAO was established. Using a neo-Roman concept of liberty, the authors show that they believed Parliamentary surveillance of the executive was necessary to secure liberty within the UK.Research limitations/implicationsThe neo-Roman republican concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, the preservation of liberty and democracy.Practical implicationsPublic sector audit can be a fundamentally democratic activity. Auditors should be alert to the constitutional importance of their work and see parliamentary accountability as a key objective.Originality/valueThe neo-Roman concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, preservation of liberty and democracy.

This is the first account of the relationship between select committees and the National Audit Office (NAO). The relationship has been often dismissed, but this article argues that it has been vital for the success of the committee system. Initially, both the committees and the audit office were established to strengthen the scrutiny of public administration. Despite the intentions of the early reformers, they did not initially collaborate. In the 1990s and 2000s, early reluctance gave way to enthusiastic collaboration between the two institutions. Initially, this collaboration focussed on financial and environmental scrutiny, but it has since expanded as the auditors have gained more confidence and the committees more familiarity with their work. Now the NAO advises committees on subjects such as European Union exit, which it would have never discussed with them only 40 years previously. This article provides both an account of that collaboration and an explanation for why the NAO and the committees have become so closely associated.

The governance of territories has become increasingly fragmented and complex, challenging the accountability arrangements for “governable spaces.” Tension between central and local governments is a perennial feature of their relationship, but few analyses have explored the implications of this tension for accountability relationships. This article assesses policy initiatives within England aimed at increasing accountability in localities, by establishing governable spaces that include territorializing, mediating, adjudicating, and subjectivizing. During the 2010s, the UK government sought to introduce a form of place‐based accountability within the context of reduced central government funding to English local authorities. This meant that local government faced new forms of accountability while adapting to considerable financial shocks. Accounting methods—assessing what phenomena can and should be governed—underpin audit and orthodox concepts of accountability in the United Kingdom. These have driven a narrow finance‐focused narrative of local audit and local accountability. However, we also argue that developments in England in the 2010s have undermined political accountability in the localities, because they have worked against critical components within it for making governable space auditable: interpretation of data, judgments on service quality and the impact of cross‐public sector relationships on local authorities’ “decision space.”

Public sector audit has grown in importance since the 1980s across the world. In this chapter, we outline the state of the current debate about public sector audit-including the role of the auditor, the purpose of audit, developments in the content of audit and the function of audit. We argue that these can be conceptualised through the literature of regulatory space. Drawing on the work of Ferry and Ahrens (2021), we set out categories which can be used to compare the ways in which different systems of local government audit can be compared and provide the justification for the intellectual approach taken by the rest of the volume.

English local government audit has gone through fundamental change in the last decade and this period of instability looks certain to continue. Since 2014, councils have been audited by private sector auditors appointed theoretically by the councils themselves (though an overwhelming majority of councils have delegated this responsibility). The scope of audit after 2014 reduced to focus mainly on top-down financial management, rather than value for money or inspection. After growing concerns about the scope and quality of audit however, in 2020, the Government commissioned Sir Tony Redmond to review local audit arrangements in England. The Redmond review identified several problems with the reformed structure and made recommendations for change. Currently, the sector is uncertain about what changes will be adopted to solve the issues discovered by Redmond.