This paper is concerned with the characteristic composition of the core political executive elite that limits political accountability as various changes occur in the political regime and economic sources of government revenue in post-colonial Nigeria. Accountability is an essential aspect of democratic governance vis-à-vis public order. As Nigeria ostensibly settles for democratic governance after myriad regime changes since independence, the paper takes issue with the characteristics of the core political executive elite that curtail political accountability. It argues that unlike advanced democracies where voters can at least identify and assign responsibilities for bad governance, voters in Nigeria are dually encumbered by elite excesses. Voters can neither assign nor act on assignments. An encumbered voter capacity weakens public accountability. Through social background and longitudinal analysis, the paper links the core political executive elite composition with restraints on political accountability. It reveals the common background characteristics with historically entrenched and exclusive interests of the elite type that impinge on accountability.
Since the 1960s, intermittent social conflicts in Nigeria appear mostly linked to ethnic groups’ differences. Considering the importance of regime change in social and political stability, this article critically analyses the historic and dynamic role of the core political executive elite in the political system's stability. The article argues that ethnic politics persist in Nigeria based on the nature of interactions between political institutions, institution‐builders, and society. It asserts a contradictory link between deep‐rooted elite interests and popular preferences in ways that undermine orientations towards democracy. The empirical focus is on the composite nature of the core political executive elite analysed through their ethnic and educational backgrounds. It is observed that, although ethnic shocks are variously motivated, the atypical shape and inequity in power and role distribution at the highest levels of executive office‐holding stand out as a salient source and target of antagonism by ethnic groups. This finding has a paradoxical implication: deep‐seated economic and political interests of the elite play a diversionary role from the real causes of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.
This article accounts for the structural changes in the form of shifts in political systems and economic sources of state revenue in post-colonial Nigeria. As Nigeria and other countries such as Brazil seek mutually to extend and intensify external relations, the need to cast further light on the post-colonial structural changes underscores the article’s relevance. Since political independence in 1960, the Nigerian political system has alternated between democratic and authoritarian types with significant increases ingovernment revenue originating from petrodollars. However, elite succession in topmost political executive offices has been marked by confusions and attended by confusions amid intense and recurrent social conflicts. The findings point to incomplete regime change with the persistence of a rigid power structure.
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