This paper analyzes a randomized tax enforcement experiment in Denmark. In the base year, a stratified and representative sample of over 40,000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment. Half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited, while the rest were deliberately not audited. The following year, "threat-of-audit" letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups. Using comprehensive administrative tax data, we present four main findings. First, we find that the tax evasion rate is very small (0.3%) for income subject to third-party reporting, but substantial (37%) for self-reported income. Since 95% of all income is third-party reported, the overall evasion rate is very modest. Second, using bunching evidence around large and salient kink points of the nonlinear income tax schedule, we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion, but that this effect is small in comparison to avoidance responses. Third, we find that prior audits substantially increase self-reported income, implying that individuals update their beliefs about detection probability based on experiencing an audit. Fourth, threat-of-audit letters also have a significant effect on self-reported income, and the size of this effect depends positively on the audit probability expressed in the letter. All these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of (rational) tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self-reported and third-party reported incomes.
We develop a framework for non-parametrically identifying optimization frictions and structural elasticities using notches-discontinuities in the choice sets of agents-introduced by for example tax and transfer policies. Notches create excess bunching on the low-tax side and missing mass on the high-tax side of a cutoff, and they are often associated with a region of strictly dominated choice that would have zero mass in a frictionless world. By combining excess bunching (observed response attenuated by frictions) with missing mass in the dominated region (frictions), it is possible to uncover the structural elasticity that would govern behavior in the absence of frictions and arguably capture long-run behavior. We apply our framework to tax notches in Pakistan using rich administrative data. While observed bunching is large and sharp, optimization frictions are also very large as the majority of taxpayers in dominated ranges are unresponsive to tax incentives. The combination of large observed bunching and large frictions implies that the frictionless behavioral response to notches is extremely large, but the underlying structural elasticity driving this response is nevertheless modest. This highlights the inefficiency of notches: by creating extremely strong price distortions, they induce large behavioral responses even when structural elasticities are small. JEL Codes: H31; J22; O12. * We are grateful for constructive comments and suggestions from Editors Lawrence Katz and Robert Barro, five anonymous referees,
Despite considerable gender convergence over time, substantial gender inequality persists in all countries. Using Danish administrative data from 1980-2013 and an event study approach, we show that most of the remaining gender inequality in earnings is due to children. The arrival of children creates a gender gap in earnings of around 20% in the long run, driven in roughly equal proportions by labor force participation, hours of work, and wage rates. Underlying these "child penalties", we find clear dynamic impacts on occupation, promotion to manager, sector, and the family friendliness of the firm for women relative to men. Based on a dynamic decomposition framework, we show that the fraction of gender inequality caused by child penalties has increased dramatically over time, from about 40% in 1980 to about 80%in 2013. As a possible explanation for the persistence of child penalties, we show that they are transmitted through generations, from parents to daughters (but not sons), consistent with an influence of childhood environment in the formation of women's preferences over family and career.
This article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in-work benefits in the 15 (pre-enlargement) countries of the European Union. We use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins, and the EUROMOD microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates. We quantify the equity-efficiency trade-off for a range of elasticity parameters. In most countries, because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase-out rates, increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme. In contrast, the in-work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
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