Strategic sourcing is carried out in cross‐functional teams to account for the complexity and multidimensionality of modern procurement decisions. However, such teams not only enable the integration of distinct interdependent skill sets and viewpoints, they are also characterized by functional goal misalignment. We focus on the resulting behavioral challenges, namely conflict and politics, and their effects on team satisfaction and rationality, which ultimately leads to observed outcomes. We test our hypotheses in a structural equation model based on data gathered from 468 participants in a social team experiment. We find a mediated effect of goal misalignment on political behavior via two types of team conflict. Political behavior, in turn, obstructs rational team sourcing decisions and reduces team members’ satisfaction with the process. Our study indicates that behavioral challenges in the framework of Organizational Buying Behavior not only co‐occur but affect each other via mediation. Hence, managers need to closely monitor the escalation chains’ origin, task conflict, which constitutes a necessary condition for further emotional dissent and political biasing. We contribute to the understanding of the challenges in cross‐functional sourcing teams, thereby providing advice to executives in their pursuit to rationalize and improve sourcing team decisions and their outcomes.

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Many strategic decisions concerning firms’ operations and supply chain management (OSCM) are executed in teams of multiple functional specialists, to reap the proven benefits of internal integration. However, specialists bring with them not only diverse expertise, but also diverse goals and incentive structures. We examine how functional goal misalignment and the distribution of knowledge of who knows what (metaknowledge) affect self‐serving politics and the performance of cross‐functional teams. To test our model, we develop a vignette‐based social team experiment and analyze data from 468 participants grouped in 156 sourcing teams. Our results provide evidence for both catalyst and inverse‐catalyst effects of the distribution of metaknowledge. Specifically, under goal alignment, centralized metaknowledge leads to the catalyzation of cross‐functional expertise, reducing team politics and enhancing team performance. However, under goal misalignment, centralized metaknowledge significantly amplifies team politics and reduces performance via mediation. We contribute to the growing body of research on behavioral OSCM at the team level of analysis by offering theoretical and practical implications for the design of team integration processes from the perspective of organizational politics and group cognition. We also provide management with clear design recommendations regarding how to govern cross‐functional OSCM teams in terms of functional goals and the distribution of metaknowledge.

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