No abstract

We examine interhemispheric cooperation in the recognition of personally known faces whose long-term familiarity ensures frequent co-activation of face-sensitive areas in the right and left brain. Images of self, friend, and stranger faces were presented for 150 ms in upright and inverted orientations both unilaterally, in the right or left visual field, and bilaterally. Consistent with previous research, we find a bilateral advantage for familiar but not for unfamiliar faces, and we demonstrate that this gain occurs for inverted as well as upright faces. We show that friend faces are recognized more quickly than unfamiliar faces in upright but not in inverted orientations, suggesting that configural processing underlies this particular advantage. Novel to this study is the finding that people are faster and more accurate at recognizing their own face over both stranger and friend faces and that these advantages occur for both upright and inverted faces. These findings are consistent with evidence for a bilateral representation of self-faces.

We respond more quickly to our own face than to other faces, but there is debate over whether this is connected to attention-grabbing properties of the self-face. In two experiments, we investigate whether the self-face selectively captures attention, and the attentional conditions under which this might occur. In both experiments, we examined whether different types of face (self, friend, stranger) provide differential levels of distraction when processing self, friend and stranger names. In Experiment 1, an image of a distractor face appeared centrally – inside the focus of attention – behind a target name, with the faces either upright or inverted. In Experiment 2, distractor faces appeared peripherally – outside the focus of attention – in the left or right visual field, or bilaterally. In both experiments, self-name recognition was faster than other name recognition, suggesting a self-referential processing advantage. The presence of the self-face did not cause more distraction in the naming task compared to other types of face, either when presented inside (Experiment 1) or outside (Experiment 2) the focus of attention. Distractor faces had different effects across the two experiments: when presented inside the focus of attention (Experiment 1), self and friend images facilitated self and friend naming, respectively. This was not true for stranger stimuli, suggesting that faces must be robustly represented to facilitate name recognition. When presented outside the focus of attention (Experiment 2), no facilitation occurred. Instead, we report an interesting distraction effect caused by friend faces when processing strangers’ names. We interpret this as a “social importance” effect, whereby we may be tuned to pick out and pay attention to familiar friend faces in a crowd. We conclude that any speed of processing advantages observed in the self-face processing literature are not driven by automatic attention capture.

Categorical perception of robustly represented faces (self, friend) and unfamiliar faces is investigated, and the relative roles of configural and featural information are examined. Participants performed identification and discrimination tasks on morph series containing the self-face and a friend's face (self-Friend 1), two friends' faces (Friend 2-Friend 3), and two unfamiliar faces (Unfamiliar 1-Unfamiliar 2), presented in upright and inverted orientations. For upright faces, categorical perception effects were observed for both familiar morph series but not for the unfamiliar morph series, suggesting that robust representation is a requirement for categorical perception in facial identity. For inverted faces, categorical perception was observed for the self-Friend 1 morph series only. This suggests that categorical perception is tied to configural processing for familiar non-self-faces, but can be observed for self-faces during featural processing-consistent with evidence that self-face representations contain strong configural and featural components. Finally, categorical perception is not enhanced by the presence of the self-face relative to other familiar faces when upright, but shows a trend of being enhanced for self-faces when inverted, adding to the debate on the ways in which robustly represented faces can elicit categorical perception.

Evidence that self-face recognition is dissociable from general face recognition has important implications both for models of social cognition and for our understanding of face recognition. In two studies, we examine how adaptation affects the perception of personally familiar faces, and we use a visual adaptation paradigm to investigate whether the neural mechanisms underlying the recognition of one’s own and other faces are shared or separate. In Study 1 we show that the representation of personally familiar faces is rapidly updated by visual experience with unfamiliar faces, so that the perception of one’s own face and a friend’s face is altered by a brief period of adaptation to distorted unfamiliar faces. In Study 2, participants adapted to images of their own and a friend’s face distorted in opposite directions; the contingent aftereffects we observe are indicative of separate neural populations, but we suggest that these reflect coding of facial identity rather than of the categories “self” and “other.”