Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement Abstract This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: desisting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We also consider policy implications of our analysis regarding an antitrust authority's investment decision in cartel enforcement. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: L13, L41, D43.
We investigate firms' incentives to locate in the same region to gain access to a large pool of skilled labor. Firms engage in risky R&D activities and thus create stochastic product and implied labor demand. Agglomeration in a cluster is more likely in situations where the innovation step is large and the probability for a firm to be the only innovator is high.When firms cluster, they tend to invest more and take more risk in R&D compared to spatially dispersed firms. Agglomeration is welfare maximizing, because expected labor productivity is higher and firms choose a more e cient, technically diversified portfolio of R&D projects at the industry level. (JEL: L13, O32, R12)We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant SPP 199, Sta 169/9-3, as well as SFB-TR 15) and the European Commission under the TMR network "The Evolution of Market Structure in Network Industries" (FMRX-CT98-0203) and under the RTN Network "The Economic Geography of Europe: Measurement, Testing and Policy Simulations" (HPRN-CT-2000-00069). We would like to thank Gilles Duranton, Rikard Forslid and seminar participants at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) and at the RTN meeting in Villars for valuable comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are ours.
This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better off if firms with weaker portfolios acquire them. (JEL D43, K11, L13, O34)
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
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