In Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks, smart meters should send fine-grained power consumption readings to electric utilities to perform real-time monitoring and energy management. However, these readings can leak sensitive information about consumers' activities. Various privacypreserving schemes for collecting fine-grained readings have been proposed for AMI networks. These schemes aggregate individual readings and send an aggregated reading to the utility, but they extensively use asymmetric-key cryptography which involves large computation/communication overhead. Furthermore, they do not address End-to-End (E2E) data integrity, authenticity, and computing electricity bills based on dynamic prices. In this paper, we propose EPIC, an efficient and privacy-preserving data collection scheme with E2E data integrity verification for AMI networks. Using efficient cryptographic operations, each meter should send a masked reading to the utility such that all the masks are canceled after aggregating all meters' masked readings, and thus the utility can only obtain an aggregated reading to preserve consumers' privacy. The utility can verify the aggregated reading integrity without accessing the individual readings to preserve privacy. It can also identify the attackers and compute electricity bills efficiently by using the fine-grained readings without violating privacy. Furthermore, EPIC can resist collusion attacks in which the utility colludes with a relay node to extract the meters' readings. A formal proof, probabilistic analysis are used to evaluate the security of EPIC, and ns-3 is used to implement EPIC and evaluate the network performance. In addition, we compare EPIC to existing data collection schemes in terms of overhead and security/privacy features.

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Deep learning architectures (DLA) have shown impressive performance in computer vision, natural language processing and so on. Many DLA make use of cloud computing to achieve classification due to the high computation and memory requirements. Privacy and latency concerns resulting from cloud computing has inspired the deployment of DLA on embedded hardware accelerators. To achieve short time-to-market and have access to global experts, state-of-the-art techniques of DLA deployment on hardware accelerators are outsourced to untrusted 3 rd parties. This outsourcing raises security concerns as hardware Trojans can be inserted into the hardware design of the mapped DLA of the hardware accelerator. We argue that existing hardware Trojan attacks highlighted in literature have no qualitative means how definite they are of the triggering of the Trojan. Also, most inserted Trojans show a obvious spike in the number of hardware resources utilized on the accelerator at the time of triggering the Trojan or when the payload is active.In this paper, we propose a hardware Trojan attack called Input Interception Attack (IIA). In this attack we make use of the statistical properties of layer-by-layer output to make sure that asides from being stealthy, our IIA is able to trigger with some measure of definiteness. This IIA attack is tested on DLA used to classify MNIST and Cifar-10 data sets. The attacked design utilizes approximately up to 2% more LUTs respectively compared to the un-compromised designs. This paper also discusses potential defensive mechanisms that could be used to combat such hardware Trojans based attack in hardware accelerators for DLA.

Internet of Things (IoT) devices have connected millions of houses around the globe via the internet. In the recent past, threats due to hardware Trojan (HT) in the integrated circuits (IC) have become a serious concern, which affects IoT edge devices (IoT-ED). In this paper, the possibility of the IoT-ED with embedded HT that can cause serious security, privacy, and availability problems to the IoT based Home Area Network (HAN) has been discussed. Conventional network attack detection techniques work at the network protocol layers, whereas IoT-ED with HT can lead to the peculiar manifestation of attack at the physical and/or firmware level. On the other hand, in the IC design, most of the HT-based attack detection techniques require design time intervention, which is expensive for many of the IoT-ED and cannot guarantee 100% immunity. The argument in this paper is that the health of modern IoT-ED requires a final line of defense against possible HT-based attacks that goes undetected during IC design and test. The approach is to utilize power profiling (PP) and network traffic (NT) data without intervening into the IC design to detect malicious activity in HAN. The proposed technique is to effectively identify multiple attacks concurrently and to differentiate between different types of attacks. The IoT-ED behaviors for five different types of random attacks have been studied, including covert channel, DoS, ARQ, power depletion, and impersonation attacks. Data fusion has been leveraged by combining the PP and NT data and is able to detect, without design time intervention, each of the five attacks individually with up to 99% accuracy. Moreover, the proposed technique can also detect all the attacks concurrently with 92% accuracy. To the best of authors' knowledge, this is the first work where multiple HT based attacks are concurrently detected in IoT-ED without requiring any design time intervention. INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, hardware security, home area network, hardware Trojan, machine learning, power profile, ARQ attack, DoS attack.

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