Introduction This article provides a meta‐analysis of a new, cognitive approach to (non‐)verbal lie detection. This cognitive lie detection approach consists of three techniques: (1) imposing cognitive load, (2) encouraging interviewees to say more, and (3) asking unexpected questions. Method A meta‐analysis was carried out on studies using the cognitive approach, 14 of which directly compared the cognitive approach to a standard approach. Results The cognitive lie detection approach produced superior accuracy results in truth detection (67%), lie detection (67%), and total detection (truth and lie detection combined, 71%) compared to a traditional standard approach (truth detection: 57%; lie detection: 47%; total detection: 56%). Conclusions Practitioners may find it useful to use a cognitive lie detection approach in their daily practice.

Do subjects, in probability revision experiments, generally neglect base rates due to the use of a representativeness heuristic, or does the use of base rates depend on what we call the internal problem representation? In Experiment 1, we used Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) engineerlawyer problem, where random sampling of descriptions is crucial to the internal representation of the problem as one in probability revision. If random sampling was performed and observed by the subjects themselves, then their judgments conformed more to Bayesian theory than to the representativeness hypothesis. If random sampling was only verbally asserted, judgments followed the representativeness heuristic. In Experiment 2 we used the soccer problem, which has the same formal structure but which the subjects' every day experience already represents as a probability revision problem. With this change in content, subjects' judgments were indistinguishable from Bayesian performance. We conclude that by manipulating presentation and content, one can elicit either base rate neglect or base rate use, as well as points in between. This result suggests that representativeness is neither an all-purpose mental strategy nor even a tendency, but rather a function of the content and the presentation of crucial information.

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An integrative framework (IMP) is presented which depicts performance in eyewitness suggestibility experiments as the participants' solutions of memory tasks, depending on (a) a specified task-relevant memory base and (b) the participants' perception of the memory task. Three theoretical explanations of the effect of misleading post-event information are reinterpreted and reduced to one single core: individuals answer test questions while assuming the consistency of event and post-event information. The impact of such consistency assumptions (a) is demonstrated in a first experiment, where the usual misinformation effect obtained with the Loftus standard test procedure disappeared when the participants' consistency assumptions were destroyed prior to testing, and (b) manifests itself in a qualitative analysis of individual processing strategies for discrepancies between details. Experiment 2, employing methodological innovations suggested by IMP, examined the memory base and found no evidence for memory impairment or misattributions of post-event details to the witnessed scene. However, a follow-up study conducted four and a half months later revealed a strong tendency for such misattributions which might indicate long-term integration of information.

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Creeping determinism, a form of hindsight bias, refers to people's hindsight perceptions of events as being determined or inevitable. This article proposes, on the basis of a causal-model theory of creeping determinism, that the underlying processes are effortful, and hence creeping determinism should disappear when individuals lack the cognitive resources to make sense of an outcome. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to read a scenario while they were under either low or high processing load. Participants who had the cognitive resources to make sense of the outcome perceived it as more probable and necessary than did participants under high processing load or participants who did not receive outcome information. Experiment 3 was designed to separate 2 postulated subprocesses and showed that the attenuating effect of processing load on hindsight bias is not due to a disruption of the retrieval of potential causal antecedents but to a disruption of their evaluation. Together the 3 experiments show that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful, and they highlight the crucial role of causal reasoning in the perception of past events.

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