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Four types of bankruptcy prediction models based on financial statement ratios, cash flows, stock returns, and return standard deviations are compared. Based on a sample of bankruptcies from 1980 to 1991, results indicate that no existing model of bankruptcy adequately captures the data. During the last fiscal year preceding bankruptcy, none of the individual models may be excluded without a loss in explanatory power. If considered in isolation, the cash flow model discriminates most consistently two to three years before bankruptcy. By comparison, the ratio model is the best single model during the year immediately preceding bankruptcy. Quasi-jack-knifing procedures suggest that none of the models can reliably predict bankruptcy more than two years in advance.Other research which compares alternative prediction models on the same data includes Collins (1980) and Hamer (1983).

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"We examine whether institutional investors are able to avoid future litigation. Our results show that institutions provide a fiduciary role by decreasing or eliminating their positions in sued firms well before litigation begins. We also find that institutional groups with high monitoring ability (independent investment advisors and mutual funds) are more proactive in their trading behavior than are institutions with low monitoring ability (banks, insurance companies, and unclassified institutions such as endowments, foundations, and self-managed pension funds). We find that percentage changes in institutional ownership are correlated with public information available more than two quarters before litigation." Copyright (c) 2008 Financial Management Association International..

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R ecent models and the popular press suggest that large groups of hedge funds follow similar strategies resulting in crowded equity positions that destabilize markets. Inconsistent with this assertion, we find that hedge fund equity portfolios are remarkably independent. Moreover, when hedge funds do buy and sell the same stocks, their demand shocks are, on average, positively related to subsequent raw and risk-adjusted returns. Even in periods of extreme market stress, we find no evidence that hedge fund demand shocks are inversely related to subsequent returns. Our results have important implications for the ongoing debate regarding hedge fund regulation.Hedge funds are crowding into more of the same trades these days, amplifying market swings during crises and unnerving investors. Such trading has stoked market jitters in recent months and helped to diminish the impact of corporate fundamentals on stock-market movements.