There is a broad consensus that the left-right dimension has been the dominant line of conflict in the European Parliament since 1979. A pro-/anti-EU dimension is found to be of secondary importance, which is attributed to the fact that decision-making over the competences of the European Union is the realm of intergovernmental negotiations. In this article, we show that the seventh EP witnessed a transformational moment in the history of the EU. The Eurozone crisis amplified the importance of the pro-/anti-EU dimension and increasingly shapes the voting behaviour of Members of the EP. This change is particularly pronounced for voting on economic issues. To demonstrate this transformation, we employ a novel deductive method that allows us to predict the relative importance of two dimensions structuring MEP voting behaviour. Our results contradict established wisdom about the strength of the left-right divide in EP politics.

The governments of Hungary and Poland have been accused of sliding toward semi‐authoritarianism. Systematic analyses of the responses of political actors at the EU level to these instances of alleged democratic backsliding are scarce, however. This article therefore investigates the responses of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to the issue of the quality of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. On the basis of data on parliamentary questions and motions for resolutions, we analyse who puts these issues on the European Parliament's (EP's) internal agenda and what positions legislators subsequently take in votes on resolutions. We find that both ideological preferences and strategic interests determine MEPs’ responses to democratic backsliding. Our findings are important for research on EU responses to democratic backsliding in EU member states as well as for the literature on party competition in the EP.

The left–right line of conflict has been the dominant dimension of decision-making in the European Parliament since 1979. A pro-/anti-European Union integration dimension is of secondary importance. Limited evidence exists on the conditions under which these different dimensions matter. This study examines parliamentary decision-making about the so-called Two-Pack, which moved responsibilities about budgetary decision-making to the European Commission. The article uses in-depth interviews, textual analysis of committee debates and roll call voting analysis in order to determine which lines of conflict matter at which stage of decision-making. The evidence indicates that left–right division is dominant in the informal stage preceding committee debates, while both the pro-/anti-European Union and the left/right dimensions matter during the committee stage, whereas for plenary votes, the pro-/anti-European Union dimension is crucial.

Note. Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. EPG p European party group. * p ! .05.

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