Panel data analysis has become very popular in comparative political economy. However, in order to draw meaningful inferences from such data, one has to address specification and estimation issues carefully. This paper aims to demonstrate various pitfalls that typically occur in applied empirical work. To illustrate this, we refer to the debate on the globalization-welfare state nexus. We reexamine a model by Garrett and Mitchell (2001), a leading study in this regard. Utilizing a data set of 17 OECD countries and the time period 1961 to 1993, they find evidence that globalization and partisan composition have a significant impact on the extent of public activity. However, because they apply a dynamic specification in levels, they do not adequately take into account both the dynamic and spherical nature of the data. In contrast, we propose an autoregressive model in first differences that is shown to perform well in statistical terms. Further, we explicitly pay attention to the time pattern of the globalization-welfare state nexus. Substantively, we find evidence that government spending is primarily driven by the state of the domestic economy. Neither partisan effects nor the international economic environment have affected public expenditure considerably. ZusammenfassungPanel-Daten erfreuen sich in politisch-ökonomischen Analysen zunehmender Beliebtheit. Allerdings enthalten derartige Daten einige ökonometrische Fallstricke, die wir in der vorliegenden Arbeit aufzeigen. Zur Illustration nehmen wir auf die Diskussion über den Zusammenhang zwischen Globalisierung und Wohlfahrtsstaat Bezug. Dazu greifen wir eine Arbeit von Garrett und Mitchell (2001) auf, in der gezeigt wird, dass Globalisierung und die parteimäßige Zusammensetzung der Regierung einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Staatstätig-keit ausüben. Wir argumentieren, dass dieses Ergebnis von ihrer Modellspezifikation (dynamische Spezifikation in Niveaugrößen) getrieben wird. Demgegenüber zeigen wir, dass in der vorliegenden Datenkonstellation die statistischen Eigenschaften des Störterms ökonometrisch korrekt nur durch ein autoregressives Modell in ersten Differenzen berücksichtigt werden können. Unter Beachtung von unterschiedlichen Phasen der Internationalisierung finden wir weiters, dass die Staatsausgabentätigkeit primär durch binnenwirtschaftliche Faktoren erklärt wird. Weder Parteieneffekte noch "Globalisierungsphänomene" haben die Veränderung der Staatsausgaben nennenswert beeinflusst.
The theory of international tax competition suggests a shift of tax burden from mobile to immobile tax bases, especially for small open economies. This paper assesses these hypotheses empirically using a sample of 23 OECD countries and the time period 1965–2000. In accordance with tax competition theory, we find that capital mobility exerts a negative impact on capital tax burden, and a positive one on labor tax burden. Further, we observe a positive effect of country size, suggesting that small open economies are levying lower capital and labor taxes than larger ones. Finally, we analyze the time pattern of tax competition and demonstrate that tax competition has intensified since the mid 1980’s. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005tax competition, capital mobility, panel data econometrics,
This article explains the absence of a race to the bottom in capital taxation by analyzing fiscal competition under budget rigidities and tax equity constraints (fairness norms). We outline a political economic model of tax competition that treats the outcome of tax competition as one argument in the governments utility function, the others being public expenditure and tax equity. In accordance with previous theoretical research, tax competition tends to cause a reduction in taxes on mobile capital and an increase in the tax rates on relatively immobile labor in our model. Yet, our model predicts that governments do not fully abolish taxes on mobile capital. Instead, the government being least restricted by budget constraints and equity norms cuts tax rates to levels slightly below the lowest tax rates of those countries, in which governments are more constrained, where effective constraints are country size, budget rigidities and fairness norms. Analyzing data from 23 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries between 1975 and 2004 we find empirical support for the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model.A striking feature of international tax competition is the fact that independent jurisdictions share a mobile tax base. As a consequence, a country lowering its capital tax rate attracts an immediate inflow of capital, thereby reducing the tax base of other countries. These respond to the shrinking tax base and to declining tax revenues by lowering their capital tax rate to competitive levels. In equilibrium, tax rates on mobile capital approach zero in all countries. This result has become popular under the ''race to the bottom'' hypothesis. 1 Yet, tax revenues are for governments what buoyancy is for swimmers: vital. As a consequence, the early models of tax competition-models predicting capital tax rates converging to zero-sent alarming shock waves to politicians. These dire expectations were fueled by political scientists who predicted that governments will find it Authors' note: For helpful comments we thank Rob Franzese, Steffen Ganghof, Mark Hallerberg, and Jude Hays. Replication data and Stata do-file can be downloaded from: http://www.polsci.org/pluemper/replication.html.1 See Wildasin (1989); Wilson (1986); and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004) provided for comprehensive surveys on subsequent research. The zero capital tax equilibrium was most prominently described by Frey
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper analyzes to which extent foreign plant ownership involves lower tax payments than domestic plant ownership. We employ a model of endogenous foreign subsidiary ownership to derive a set of empirically testable hypotheses about the differential taxation of foreign-and domestically-owned subsidiaries. We assess these hypotheses in a data-set of 33,577 European foreign-and domestically-owned manufacturing plants. We identify a significant tax-saving of endogenous foreign owner-ship. On average, foreign owners pay 594 Euros per employee or about 56 percent less than domestic owners of similar subsidiaries. This effect is larger in thinner markets with fewer plants, in markets with a greater relative presence of foreign owners, and for foreign owners of larger plants. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: H25, H73, F23, C21.
Corporate taxation, Foreign direct investment, Panel econometrics, H25, H73, F21, F23, C33,
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.