The regulatory state and the welfare state are two institutions that are central to the analysis of the characteristics of capitalist democracies. The regulatory state is seen as focused on market failures and trust-busting, while the welfare state is said to shield citizens from the negative redistributive effects and externalities of the market. This article explores the relations and boundaries between the welfare state and the regulatory state in the electricity sectors in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Israel. It demonstrates the emergence of social policy within the context of liberalized, privatized, and (de)regulated electricity sectors. This article finds that the boundaries between the regulatory state and the welfare state are blurred in Israel and the United Kingdom but not in Sweden. These findings may imply a connection between the welfare state and the regulatory state, suggesting that a strong welfare state is needed in order to maintain regulation-for-competition.

How does the rising 'regulatory welfare state' address social policy concerns in pension markets? This study examines this question by comparing the regulatory responses to high charges paid by low-income workers in pension markets in the UK and Israel. In the UK, with the recognition that the market would not cater to low-income workers, the regulatory response was the creation of a publicly operated low-cost pension fund (NEST), a 'public option' within the market. This allowed low-income workers access to a low level of charges, previously reserved for high-income and organised workers. In Israel, regulation sought to empower consumers, while providing minimal social protection by capping pension charges at a relatively high level, thereby leaving most of the responsibility for reducing the charges with the individual saver. By comparing these two cases, the article develops an analytical framework for the study of the regulatory welfare state, making two contributions. First, it highlights different types of regulatory citizenship: minimal regulatory social protection as opposed to a more egalitarian approach. Second, it identifies an overlooked regulatory welfare state strategy: creating 'public option' arrangements, whereby a state-run (but not funded) service operates within the market.

This paper explores the relation between economic liberalization, regulation and welfare. It asks how the state regulates, delays or prevents service disconnection due to debt and arrears, and what this kind of policy implies regarding the use of regulation as a form of social policy. This is done through a comparative study of the electricity and water sectors in Israel after liberalization. It finds that after initial economic reform, both sectors saw a growth in regulation intended to compensate for the social effects of reform, in what may be termed the Regulatory Welfare State. However, this form of social protection has been residual and incoherent. The paper argues that trying to separate economic reform from its social consequences is unrealistic and may lead to adverse social and economic results. Second, findings raise concerns regarding the potential of the Regulatory Welfare State to deliver effective and fair social policy.

This article asks how the UK and Sweden regulate, prevent, or mitigate the consequences of mortgage‐related household eviction and repossession. Contrary to initial expectations, the findings show a growth and diversity in both regulation and social spending in the UK intended to address this social issue; something that has not occurred in Sweden. In the UK's liberal ‘regulatory welfare regime’, the aim is to prevent the eviction and repossession of vulnerable borrowers who have defaulted on their housing loan. In the Swedish social democratic ‘regulatory welfare regime’, effort focuses instead on minimizing the risk of default before it occurs rather than after the fact. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of the relations between regulation and welfare more generally, demonstrating that regulation may be used as a form of social policy once the welfare state has failed, as a safety net of last resort.