This study highlights a theoretical dilemma about the mixed implications of a firm’s R&D alliance network for its innovation performance. That is, knowledge sharing among R&D alliance partners can both benefit the focal firm with access to external knowledge and skill sets and expose it to potential risks of knowledge leakage and misappropriation, thus both advancing and hampering the focal firm’s innovation performance. Drawing on the network pluralism perspective, we address this dilemma by highlighting the interplay between the network embeddedness forces exerted by a firm’s R&D alliance network and other networks the focal firm participates in. Specifically, we find that a strong industrial network built upon the coalition and associations among peer firms in the focal firm’s industry can intensify the nonmonotonic (inverted U-shaped) effect of an R&D alliance network on the firm’s innovation performance, while the firm’s strong political connections with governments can weaken the effect of an R&D alliance network. In addition, such interplay between different networks tends to be strengthened by the focal firm’s technological capability.

A large body of research has examined social networks in organizational contexts. While this work has enhanced scholars' understanding of the antecedents and consequences of networks, missing from this literature is a comprehensive framework that simplifies and clarifies this complex body of work. In response, the authors develop a framework that classifies network research into four major categories, with the purpose of guiding scholars' choices among the various theories, constructs, measures, research designs, and analytic strategies inherent in the social network literature. The authors also provide recommendations for future work aimed at advancing the state of network research in organizational contexts.

Research Summary: This study addresses a theoretical dilemma regarding how alliance network constraint (reflected by network cohesion) affects a firm's alliance formation with new partners. Using a network pluralism approach, we separate a firm's ego alliance network into two activity-based networks-an exploratory network and an exploitative network-based on the primary value chain activity involved in each alliance. We argue that the cohesion of exploratory or exploitative networks has an inverted U-shaped effect on the addition of new partners in the same activity-based network, and a positive effect on the addition of new partners in the other network. Results based on data from the biotechnology industry largely support our predictions with one exception. Our study contributes to both scholarly understanding of network embeddedness and alliance practice. Managerial Summary: The structure of firms' ongoing alliance networks may have paradoxical implications for their efforts to search for and form alliance with new partners. That is, when a firm's alliance partners are tightly connected with each other, the cohesive network tends to both encourage and impede the focal firm to add new partners. We resolve this dilemma by showing that when a firm is deeply entrenched in a cohesive alliance network conducting a certain type of activities (e.g., R&D activities), it may not easily add new R&D alliance partners. However, it may still be able to escape from the cohesive R&D alliance network by seeking new partners conducting other activities (e.g., manufacturing activities).

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship-jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network-based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive-level ship-jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship-jumping decision.Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (*ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U-shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well-established firm-level alliance network discourage the ship-jumping choice.Note. We report SHR and Z-scores based on robust standard errors. SHRs lower than 1 indicate that increases in independent variables decrease the hazard rate, and those greater than 1 indicate that increases in independent variables increase the hazard rate. The number 1 indicates no change. SHR = Subdistribution Hazard Ratio. The bolded values highlight the results that parallel with our main findings.

Research Summary We develop a political path dependence model that integrates the network embeddedness perspective and the literature on corporate political strategy to understand how firms adapt their political connections when anticorruption efforts lead to the turnover of government officials. We posit that although firms that have close associations with ousted corrupt officials can benefit from both removing existing political connections (“cleaning house”) and developing new connections with their successors (“hosting new guests”), political path dependence enables firms to do the former but constrains them from doing the latter. These effects are magnified when firms are highly dependent on the government, and when the ousted corrupt officials have great political power. Evidence from anticorruption campaigns in China between 2012 and 2018 lends support for our theoretical predictions. Managerial Summary It is common for firms to strive to stay connected with government officials. Of interest is, when political power shifts, can firms “update” their connections by severing ties with politicians who fall out of power and building new ones? Our political path dependent model demonstrates that it may not be a symmetric process. After the downfall and replacements of public officials due to corruption indictments, firms that are more closely associated with ousted, corrupt officials will indeed be more motivated and able to remove existing connections. However, the successors of ousted officials will more likely distance themselves from these firms, thereby undermining the firms' abilities to build new connections with them. Empirical evidence from anticorruption campaigns in China between 2012 and 2018 supports our predictions.