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Nonprofit, public, and for-profit welfare institutions have different operational logics. The distinctiveness of a nonprofit institution is more prominent in some circumstances than in others. This paper is based on case studies conducted in Norwegian municipalities to understand when and why nonprofits operate with distinctive steering mechanisms. Based on the framework of hybrid organizations, I analyze the interaction among institutions in the public sector that have democratic legitimacy through a hierarchical organization, the forprofit sector that seeks efficiency to compete in the market, and the nonprofit sector that has civil society logic. The study revealed how more detached demand-driven oversight of nonprofit schools gives them more room to pursue goals different from those of the public sector institutions, which can be contrasted with the supply-driven oversight of nursing homes that have far less room for steering independent of the municipalities. Surprisingly, the results also suggested that small close-knit communities influence institutions in ways that diverge from the hierarchical steering, and that this happens across the sector split. Moreover, oversight and alternative sources of income contribute to making the organization more hybrid, in the sense that the hierarchical steering is challenged.

The traditional goal of equality in services remains at the heart of the Scandinavian welfare model; however, in recent decades, policymakers have also placed increased emphasis on user influence over services. Voice and choice are two channels to achieve this goal. The possibility to give feedback and voicing dissatisfaction to service providers (voice) is a well-established channel of service users' influence, however it is increasingly supplemented by user choice schemes (choice), where one can choose between different public and private service providers. We use the case of domiciliary care for the elderly to examine how the traditional goal of user equality is associated with the growing emphasis on user influence through voice and choice. The analyses are based on user surveys carried out by the municipality in the city of Oslo, which is arguably the only municipality in Norway where user choice plays a significant role in elderly care. Since the municipality subsidizes the private providers, individual economic resources should have less relevance. However, voicing dissatisfaction and choosing between different providers may anticipate cognitive resources that are not equally distributed among the users. The survey data indicate that there is an association between level of education and propensity to exploit all

Research on differences between public, forprofit, and nonprofit providers of welfare services has provided mixed findings, depending on welfare state arrangement, regulation, and service area. This paper's objective is to study the differences between public, nonprofit (cooperatives and other nonprofits), and for-profit welfare providers from the perspective of the users in the tightly regulated Scandinavian context. We ask how the users perceive the providers from different sectors differently and how this variation can be explained. The study relies on a large-scale survey carried out in 2015 in the city of Oslo, Norway. From the survey, we identify the two main results. First, despite limited differences, users of nonprofit kindergartens are generally more satisfied than users of for-profit and public kindergartens. Second, an important explanation for variations in user satisfaction among kindergartens is identified in a pocket of regulatory leniency: the quality of food service. This is the only expense that varies among kindergartens in Norway. These results indicate that more lenient regulations could potentially increase provider distinctiveness. Based on the existing literature, we discuss why nonprofit providers seem to fare better in the minds of users than public and for-profit providers.

Democratic user control is a hallmark of Scandinavian schools, but also of other services of the Scandinavian welfare states. This article studies variations in parental control and influences in public and non-public schools. In addition, how the use of different governance tools inspired by markets affects user control is analyzed. The empirical investigation consists of matching public and nonpublic schools and nursing homes in three Norwegian municipalities. The study concludes that there is important variation between public and non-public schools, while there is little variation between public and non-public nursing homes. The organization of the quasi-market is an important explanation for this.

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