This paper revisits the relationship between nurse staffing and quality of care in nursing homes using an instrumental variables approach. Most prior studies rely on cross-sectional evidence, which renders causal inference problematic and policy recommendations inappropriate. We exploit legislation changes regarding minimum staffing requirements in eight states between 2000 and 2001 as exogenous shocks to nurse staffing levels. We find that registered nurse staffing has a large and significant impact on quality of care, and that there is no evidence of a significant association between nurse aide staffing and quality of care. A comparison of the IV estimation to the OLS estimation of the first-difference model suggests that ignoring endogeneity would lead to an underestimation of how nurse staffing affects quality of care in nursing homes.

This paper revisits the relationship between nurse staffing and quality of care in nursing homes using an instrumental variables approach. Most prior studies rely on cross-sectional evidence, which renders causal inference problematic and policy recommendations inappropriate. We exploit legislation changes regarding minimum staffing requirements in eight states between 2000 and 2001 as exogenous shocks to nurse staffing levels. We find that registered nurse staffing has a large and significant impact on quality of care, and that there is no evidence of a significant association between nurse aide staffing and quality of care. A comparison of the IV estimation to the OLS estimation of the first-difference model suggests that ignoring endogeneity would lead to an underestimation of how nurse staffing affects quality of care in nursing homes.

This article develops a dynamic model of entry and exit to analyze quality choice and oligopoly market structure in the nursing home industry. I find significant heterogeneity in the competitive effects across market structures: Firms of similar quality levels compete more strongly than dissimilar firms. Sunken entry costs are extremely large, and quality adjustment behavior is governed by significant fixed adjustment costs. A proposal to eliminate low-quality nursing homes is found to cause a large supply-side shortage, and another proposal to lower entry costs has offered a perverse incentive to provide low quality of care.

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