We develop an estimation approach based on a modified expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and a mixture of normal distributions associated with skill groups to assess performance in hedge funds. By allowing luck to affect both skilled and unskilled funds, we estimate the number of skill groups, the fraction of funds from each group, and the mean and variability of skill within each group. For each individual fund, we propose a performance measure combining the fund’s estimated alpha with the cross-sectional distribution of fund skill. In out-of-sample tests, an investment strategy using our performance measure outperforms those using estimated alpha and t-statistic.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts interfund lending and borrowing within a mutual fund family, but families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in such transactions. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family’s decision to apply for the interfund lending programs. We document several benefits of such programs for equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Second, fund investors exhibit less run-like behavior. Third, it helps mitigate asset fire sales after extreme investor redemptions. Offsetting these benefits, money market funds in participating families experience investor outflows.
Received May 26, 2018; editorial decision November 27, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds' investment restrictions, and governance mechanisms influence the fund family's decision to apply for interfund lending. We document several costs and benefits of interfund lending. Costs include lower sensitivity of managers' turnover to past performance and greater investor withdrawal for poorly governed funds. Benefits include funds being able to hold more illiquid and concentrated portfolios, and being less susceptible to runs. JEL Classification: G18, G23, G32 , 2014, Hazardous times for monetary policy: what do twenty-three million bank loans say about the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking? Econometrica 82, 463-550.
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