Virtue reliabilists claim that knowledge requires responsibly employing one's reliable beliefforming process. Responsible employment requires that the agent is either aware that her process is reliable or is sensitive to her process's reliability in some way. Recent philosophy of mind literature proposes that in some cases a cognitive mechanism, i.e. precision estimation, can ensure that a belief-forming process is only employed as long as it's reliable. This means that epistemic responsibility can sometimes be explained entirely on the subpersonal level. In this paper, I argue that the mechanism of precision estimation-the alleged new variety of epistemic responsibility-is more ubiquitously present than epistemic responsibility. I show that precision estimation operates at levels that have nothing to do with the epistemic domain. Lastly, I explain how all subpersonal epistemologies are likely to fall prey to worries like the problem of demarcating the cognitive agency and the problem of attributing beliefs.
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