Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature "lockup" agreements, which bar insiders from selling the stock for a set period following the IPO, usually 180 days. We examine stock price behavior in the period surrounding lockup expiration for a sample of 2,529 firms from 1988 to 1997. We find that lockup expirations are, on average, associated with significant and negative abnormal returns, but the losses are concentrated in firms with venture capital backing. For the venture-capital-backed group, the largest losses occur for high-tech firms and firms with the greatest post-IPO stock price increases, the largest relative trading volume in the period surrounding expiration, and the highest quality underwriters.

We examine financing, investment and investment performance in the equity REIT sector over the 1981-1999 time period. Analysis reveals significant differences between the old- REIT (1981REIT ( -1992 and new- REIT (1993REIT ( -1999 eras. The sector experienced rapid growth in the new-REIT era, primarily from firmlevel investment as opposed to new entry. Firm-level investment was largely financed by equity and long-term debt, with little reliance on retained earnings. Financing policy stabilized in the new-REIT era, and capital structures became more complex. We find that REITs provided returns over and above their cost of capital, where most of the value-added investment occurred in the new-REIT era by newer firms. Finally, we present novel evidence on IPO activity and new firm investment-investment performance relations that is consistent with Tobin's q theory of investment.Do real estate investment trusts (REITs) destroy or generate value for the shareholders? What is the relation between investment and investment performance? How do REITs finance their investments? Do financial policies of REITs mimic or depart substantially from those adopted by most firms in the U.S. stock market? How do performance relations change depending on the time period? The answers to these questions are still largely unknown, more than four decades after Congress first introduced REITs to American investors.To address these questions, we measure investment, investment performance and the financing of investment in the equity REIT sector over a sample period from 1981 through 1999. We are particularly interested in identifying differences between the relatively sleepy, slow-growth "old-REIT" era of the 1980s and early 1990s and the dynamic, high-growth "new-REIT" era that began around 1992-1993.

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We reject the hypothesis that investment and commercial banks have identical loan-pricing policies. We find that compared to commercial banks, investment banks lend to less profitable, more lever aged firms, price riskier classes of term loans more generously, and offer relatively longer-term credits, usually with term, not commitment contracts. Investment banks typically establish higher credit spreads, although the premium declines when a commercial bank joins as syndicate co-arranger. Investment banks also price riskier classes of term loans more generously to borrowers than do commercial banks. Commercial-bank funding advantages do not appear to be a source of the pricing differences. Copyright (c) 2006 Financial Management Association International.